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Abstract 
 
Title: International Corporate Governance - A Comparison of the 
Corporate Governance Systems in Germany and Sweden. 
 
Seminar date:  2006-06-08 
 
Course: Master thesis in business administration, major: Strategic 
Management, 10 Swedish Credits (15 ECTS).  
 
Authors:  Anna Kruk, Marie Nilsson 
   
Advisor:  Anna Stafsudd 
 
Key words: Corporate governance, Germany, Sweden, content analysis, 
media 
 
Purpose: The purpose of the study is to investigate how much interest 
media has shown selected topics in the corporate governance 
systems in Germany and Sweden. The four selected aspects are: 
ownership structure, employee representation on the boards, 
disclosure of board members’ compensation and female 
directors on the boards. The reasons for and consequences of the 
similarities and differences will also be discussed. 
Theoretical 
perspectives: The German and Swedish corporate governance systems 
construct the key basis of the study, emphasised on the four 
chosen aspects. Theories and previous research within the subject 
are presented and the convergence issue is discussed. 
 
Methodology: The quantitative content analysis method is applied when 
conducting the research of the newspaper articles from Die Welt 
(Germany) and Svenska Dagbladet (Sweden). 
Empirical 
foundation: Based  on  the  empirical  findings  of  the  study  could  the four 
 hypotheses be accepted, more or less. The topics debated within 
the aspects were different between the two countries. Cultural 
and societal differences were central reasons for these results. 
  
Conclusions: As the study of the German and Swedish media has been 
conducted, several interesting differences in the debates on the 
four aspects have been found. The conclusion drawn based on 
these results is that the German corporate governance system, 
compared to the Swedish system, is less flexible and has more 
problems to be competitive and keep up with the international 
competition. 
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Sammanfattning 
 
Uppsatsens titel: Internationell bolagsstyrning - En jämförelse av bolags-
styrningssystemen i Tyskland och Sverige. 
 
Seminariedatum: 2006-06-08 
 
Ämne/kurs: FEK 591 Magisteruppsats i företagsekonomi med inriktning 
Strategic Management, 10 poäng. 
 
Författare: Anna Kruk, Marie Nilsson 
   
Handledare:    Anna Stafsudd 
   
Fem nyckelord: Bolagsstyrning, Tyskland, Sverige, innehållsanalys, media 
 
Syfte: Syftet med uppsatsen är att undersöka hur mycket intresse 
media har visat utvalda ämnen i bolagsstyrningssystemen i 
Tyskland och Sverige. De fyra utvalda aspekterna är: 
ägarstruktur, arbetstagarrepresentation i styrelsen, offentlig- 
görandet av styrelsemedlemmars kompensationer samt 
kvinnliga styrelsemedlemmar. Orsakerna och konsekvenserna 
till likheterna och skillnaderna kommer också att diskuteras.  
 
Teoretiskt perspektiv: Uppsatsen utgår från de tyska och svenska bolagsstyrnings- 
systemen, med betoning på de fyra utvalda aspekterna. Teorier 
och tidigare studier inom området presenteras och konvergens- 
problematiken diskuteras.  
 
Metod: Den använda metoden är kvantitativ innehållsanalys då 
tidningsartiklar i Die Welt (Tyskland) och Svenska Dagbladet 
(Sverige) studeras. 
 
Empiri: Med stöd av de empiriska upptäckterna i undersökningen har 
de fyra hypoteserna kunnat accepteras, mer eller mindre. 
Ämnena som debatterades inom aspekterna skiljde sig åt 
mellan de båda länderna. De kulturella och samhälleliga 
skillnaderna var utav central betydelse för resultaten. 
 
Slutsatser: Efter att ha genomfört studien utav tysk och svensk media 
fann vi ett antal intressanta skillnader i debatten kring de fyra 
aspekterna. Slutsatsen som dras utifrån resultaten är att det 
tyska bolagsstyrningssystemet är mindre flexibelt än det 
svenska och därmed har större problem att vara 
konkurrenskraftigt och hävda sig i den internationella 
konkurrensen. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
In this chapter, the background and problem discussion constituting the basis for 
the problem, which this thesis is to analyse, are presented. Furthermore, the 
purpose and the delimitations of the thesis are treated. The outline of the study is 
eventually described. 
 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
orporate governance has been a very important aspect within corporations 
for a long time. It was developed during the 19th century as the firms went 
through many crucial developments, which have created the foundation of the 
corporations that exists today. Firms grew larger, more technology advanced, and 
the firms employed more people, which all in all meant that the need for larger 
capital sources was accompanying. For these reasons private ownership of 
investment property, later on stocks, got “accepted as a social norm”. The 
shareholders owned the stock themselves, but gave up the right to control the use 
of the corporation’s property, which got delegated to skilled managers. Ever since 
has the separation of ownership and control been central of the struggles over 
corporate governance. (Monks & Minow 2001) 
 
With the separation of ownership and control as a starting point, Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) conducted studies based on the 
agency theory in the 70s-80s. Since then, the agency theory has become one of the 
most important corner stones of the corporate governance we have today. They 
argued that managers (agents) have to be monitored to make sure that they work 
in the best interest of the company and its shareholders (principals) and not abuse 
their position.  
 
In connection to this, in the mid 80s, the term “corporate governance” had it’s 
truly break through in the US and has had a strong and essential development 
since. Still, it was first as the Enron case was revealed in March 2002 that the 
importance of corporate governance became truly well-known to the worldwide 
public.  
 
The problems and shortcomings in corporate governance implicated by the Enron 
case became obvious not only to the public, but to the governments as well. It was 
made clear that enhanced transparency was needed urgently. As a result, the 
C 
International Corporate Governance 
A Comparison of the Corporate Governance Systems in Germany and Sweden 
 
 
 2 
governments in the Western World have started to take more action to prevent 
mismanagement of the corporations in their countries. (Swedish Code of 
Corporate Governance 2004; Hutter et al. 2002)  
 
Nevertheless, corporate governance is often discussed by the media in Germany 
and Sweden as well as in other developed countries. The Enron case was namely 
just one scandal among others. Famous European scandals are for example the 
Mannesmann case and the Royal Dutch case in Germany, the Skandia case in 
Sweden, and the Parmalat case in Italy. Cases where the managements inter alia 
decided to approve large compensation programs without the boards’ approval. 
This, combined with a demand for clearer regulations of corporate governance 
from investors, has lead to a fast development of corporate governance codes in 
the European countries.  
 
The topic corporate governance is, as pointed out above, in every manager’s, 
shareholders’ and newspapers’ use today. According to a research conducted by 
SAS Institutes for the time period January-September 2005, corporate governance 
(bolagsstyrning) was the word of which the use in the Swedish business 
newspapers had increased second most (+153 %) during 2005 compared to the 
research period 2003-2004 (SAS Institute 2005). This result stresses that 
corporate governance has not only increased in actuality and importance abroad 
but also in Sweden and in the Swedish newspapers.  
 
As the problem with insufficient corporate governance seems to be an 
international issue, one could think that it would be better to converge the 
different corporate governance systems to one single system for all countries. 
However, corporate governance has aspects that are specific to the different 
countries. The reason for this is that each country has had its own way to assure 
that the companies are accountable for their actions and this custom is hard to 
change since the whole society is built upon it (Almond et al. 2003). As a result, 
laws and codes of corporate governance are produced separately in each country 
even if all countries try to learn from mistakes and arisen problems in other 
countries, preventing them from taking place in the future.  
 
In the search for the optimal corporate governance system are benchmarks 
between the countries conducted. Though this procedure causes a kind of best 
practice to emerge, it also seems to present evidence for a convergence in 
corporate governance, suggesting that it isn’t impossible that a united model will 
emerge in the future despite cultural and social differences (Almond et al. 2003). 
Nevertheless, results from several studies present mixed results on the 
convergence issue, there are for instance several studies pointing at the opposite, 
i.e. convergences are not possible and have so far not been revealed between the 
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German and the Anglo-Saxon system1 (Hackethal et al. 2005) or within Europe 
(Lewis et al. 2004). Carati and Tourani Rad (2000) on the other hand argue that 
the convergence process has just recently started, where the group-based model 
(in Europe and Japan) slowly turn towards the market-based model (in the UK 
and US). Thus, they argue that the studies conducted on the convergence issue 
cannot prove a converging trend today, since the development has just started.  
 
 
1.2 Problem Discussion 
 
Prior studies of corporate governance systems have mainly been comparing larger 
economies like the UK and/or US versus Germany or Japan (Jackson & Moerke 
2005; La Porta et al. 2000; Mintz 2005; Weimer & Pape 1999). These studies 
have been conducted with the intention to compare and contrast the different 
systems, often with the focus on the divergence issue, i.e. if the different systems 
are developing to be more and more like the Anglo-Saxon. Some studies are 
however focusing on the legal framework of corporate governance in different 
countries or trying to design a taxonomy of the different systems. Studies on small 
economies like Sweden, Switzerland, Poland, Denmark etc. have often been 
diminished. Studies comparing the German and Swedish corporate governance 
systems have been conducted almost exclusively in connection with studies of 
larger countries (Almond et al. 2003; Eriksson & Trulsson 2001).  
 
Not disregarding, there are a few studies comparing the developments of 
corporate governance in smaller European countries. An example is the biennial 
Heidrick and Struggles’ corporate governance study, which examines how the 
European countries are developing on board structure, board composition and 
disclosure of board members compensation. In their study, ten countries were 
included, among others Germany and Sweden. The study revealed central 
differences between Germany and Sweden on the board compensation and 
disclosure issues. (Albert-Roulhac & Breen 2005) The disclosure of board 
members compensation is a burning topic in Germany at moment, due to the new 
law regarding this issue (Homepage of Bundesministerium der Justiz). In Sweden 
on the other hand, the disclosure of salaries etc. is custom, due to the right of 
public access to official records. Since transparency is a key aspect of good 
corporate governance and there is a legal difference between the countries, we 
find it essential to include this aspect in our study.  
 
Moreover, the biennial Heidrick and Struggles’ corporate governance study 
showed that the number of women in the board rooms was on average low in all 
                                                           
1 Explanation of the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon systems will follow in the problem discussion 1.2 
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countries studied, which according to Albert-Roulhac & Breen (2005) remains a 
major concern. This aspect, female directors on the boards, is one of the most 
recent and modern topics in the corporate governance debate, since the 
international trend indicates that more women are working at higher levels of the 
corporations. As Sweden alongside with Norway are considered being ahead of 
the rest of the world within this topic, it’s interesting to compare Sweden with 
other countries to investigate if this is true. Are there truly significant differences 
between Germany and Sweden when it comes to attitudes regarding female 
directors on the boards, percentage ratios etc.? Or are the countries rather similar? 
Why do these differences/similarities exist? 
 
We argue that the small amount of studies conducted on small countries can be 
due to the complexity of comparing the systems of smaller countries. Almond et 
al. (2003) conducted a study, comparing among others the German and Swedish 
corporate governance systems. They reveal that the Anglo-American shareholder 
value model2 has influenced some aspects of the corporate governance systems in 
the two countries, e.g. the compensation of top executives, while other aspects 
have remained intact. They are however concluding that there is an extensive need 
for evidence of cross-national nature before well-founded conclusions can be 
drawn. It is thus of interest to compare and contrast some aspects in the German 
and Swedish corporate governance systems. 
 
Sweden is often divided into the Germanic corporate governance system (Scott; 
De Jong; Moreland; and Weimer in Weimer & Pape 1999), which will be the 
viewpoint of Sweden in this study as well, as major similarities exist between the 
two systems. The ownership structure in Sweden is highly concentrated, due to a 
dual-class share system and pyramid holding companies, allowing for one or a 
few major owners to control large Swedish companies (Barca & Becht 2001). 
This is in line with the characteristics of the Germanic system. The aspect 
ownership structure is also being studied in this thesis as it constitutes a major and 
clear similarity between Germany and Sweden. Both countries are primarily 
characterised by a concentrated ownership structure, but have somewhat different 
types of major owners. Moreover, a number of studies (e.g. Barca & Becht 2001; 
Monks & Minow 2001; Jackson & Moerke 2005;) point out that the role of major 
owners is changing in Germany and Sweden, which stresses the fact that it’s a 
burning topic going through essential developments. This aspect is thus relevant 
to include in this study. 
 
 
                                                           
2 The shareholder value model of capitalism emphasises the dominance of the interests of stock 
holders over other stakeholders within a corporation. (Lazonick and O’Sullivan in Almond et al 
2003) 
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Another essential similarity between the Germanic and Swedish system is the 
existence of employee representation rights. Shallowly seen, one might think that 
this law is constructed and emphasised equally in the two countries and is 
similarly dominant or weak, but this is not completely the case. According to 
previous studies (e.g. Lewis et al. 2004; Muller 1999), employee representation 
on the boards does hold vital consequences for all stakeholders and the 
corporation as a whole; therefore this aspect is, according to us, considered as 
important and will be included in the study.  
 
The Germanic system is however characterised by a two-tier board system, with a 
management board (Vorstand) and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and is 
classified as an insider system. The insider system is characterised by 
concentrated ownership, allowing a few major owners to control the corporation. 
In insider systems, the owners of larger firms, often banks, have a long-term 
relationship with the corporation and close links with managers evolve, allowing 
the major owners access to internal information. (Almond et al. 2003; Goergen 
1998)  
 
The position of Sweden in the Germanic corporate governance system can on the 
other hand be somewhat ambiguous and questionable. As the Swedish board 
structure is not following the two-tiered system, but a one-tiered system. It can 
hence be argued that Sweden is positioned somewhere in between the Anglo-
Saxon and the Germanic system (Swedish Code of corporate governance 2004). 
The Anglo-Saxon system has adopted a one-tier board of directors, which oppose 
to the German board system, the management and supervisory tasks of the board 
are united in one legal body. The external market for corporate control, also 
named as the takeover market, plays an important role. Yet, the Anglo-Saxon 
system is an outsider system, which is characterised by low ownership 
concentration and a strong institutionalisation of the shareholders ability to 
influence the companies. (Weimer & Pape 1999) These characteristics are not in 
line with the Swedish characteristics, which imply that Sweden might belong in 
the Germanic system after all. This circular reasoning has resulted in a discussion 
of whether the Swedish system truly belongs to the Germanic system; studies 
conducted on Swedish corporate governance are consequently important and 
interesting. In order to investigate this problem, this study is conducted with the 
standpoint that Sweden is positioned in the Germanic system, since this is the 
most common classification. This classification will however be questioned in this 
thesis as there obviously are some differences between the German and Swedish 
systems, although they are positioned in the same global corporate governance 
system (Germanic).  
 
According to the committee of Swedish corporate governance, the future role of 
monitoring and punishment verdicts of corporations and managers not following 
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the code is a role of the media (Svenska Dagbladet 2005-04-08), since the code is 
based on a comply or explain principle and not law. This means that the media not 
only constitutes a media for debating the issue, but also have a central and 
difficult role in the corporate governance debate and therefore is seen as an origin 
of ethical and moral topics.  
 
Furthermore, media possesses a great power due to its ability to mould the public 
opinion. What media decides to publish and how it chooses to do it, i.e. what 
attitudes it presents in the different issues, not only reflects what media considers 
as interesting for its own readers or viewers, but also what it wants to debate and 
considers essential. It can therefore be said that media creates a picture of the real 
world and consequently shapes the readers’ and viewers’ expectations of the real 
world. These expectations are reflected in the readers’ and viewers’ actions and 
thus risks being self-reinforcing. Media’s attitude is therefore an important force 
in the society. As a consequence, media play a significant role for the future 
development of corporate governance and the feasible convergence between the 
different corporate governance systems and codes. However, studies investigating 
the media’ role in the corporate governance debate have not been found. A 
comparative study of the German and Swedish corporate governance systems, 
analysing the information published by the media, consequently is a new and 
interesting way to investigate the subject.  
 
The four aspects, emphasised and discussed previously are selected and studied as 
they handle diverging, relevant and burning aspects of the international corporate 
governance debate. We considered them as one of the most crucial topics for a 
comparative study of the German and Swedish systems. The four aspects are 
aiming to graze the current development in the debates taking place in the two 
countries, and therefore the role of the media is central in this study. 
 
 
1.3 Purpose 
 
The purpose of the study is to investigate how much interest media has shown 
selected topics in the corporate governance systems in Germany and Sweden. The 
selected aspects are the following: 
  
1) ownership structure  
2) employee representation on the boards 
3) disclosure of board members’ compensation  
4) female directors on the boards 
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The thesis will provide a deeper understanding for the differences and similarities 
of the systems in the two countries and explain why these take place. Customs and 
social aspects will be considered when answering the question why differences 
exist. The consequences of these similarities and differences found in these 
aspects will also be discussed. Furthermore, the thesis aims to frame/outline the 
future development of the corporate governance debate in Germany and Sweden 
and graze the convergence issue, but the convergence aspect will not be a central 
point for the reasoning in this thesis. 
 
 
1.4 Delimitation 
 
As the thesis is conducted from an economical view, with economical theories of 
corporate governance and the two chosen systems as foundations for the analysis, 
the law aspect is studied to a limited extent. It’s although important to point out 
that corporate governance isn’t possible to study and analyse from a strict 
economical point of view, without a somewhat analysis of the countries corporate 
laws and regulations. Consequently, central laws within the selected aspects in 
Germany and Sweden are studied superficially and compared with each other, but 
no detail comparisons of the national regulations are conducted.  
 
 
1.5 Outline 
 
The master thesis consists of five chapters which all will begin with a brief 
presentation of their content. The continuing outline of the thesis is presented 
below: 
 
Chapter 2  Theoretical framework  
The chapter presents the theories and concepts that create the 
foundation of the thesis. The reader will get familiar with the 
global corporate governance systems and get a closer insight into 
the four chosen aspects in the context of the German and Swedish 
corporate governance systems. Theories will be presented with the 
aim to make the reader able to understand the discussion and 
argumentation further on in the thesis.  
 
Chapter 3  Methodology 
This chapter aims to declare the method selection with emphasis on 
the content analysis method. The code manual and the 
accomplishment of the coding are explained. Furthermore, the 
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course of action used to conduct the study is outlined to explain the 
way the method is applied and in that way enhance the possibilities 
to replicate the study. A discussion of the reliability and validity of 
the thesis will conclude the chapter. 
 
Chapter 4  Results and analysis 
In this chapter, the results from the study will be presented and 
analysed in order to answer the four hypotheses and fulfil the 
purpose of the thesis. The chapter concludes with a summary of the 
results.  
 
Chapter 5  Concluding discussion 
In this chapter, the results revealed and analysed in chapter 4, will 
be discussed further, related to previous studies and connected with 
each other. Furthermore, the convergence issue will be handled and 
the future development of the corporate governance debate in 
Germany and Sweden will be discussed. Final conclusions will be 
drawn, and topics/questions interesting for further research will be 
outlined. 
International Corporate Governance 
A Comparison of the Corporate Governance Systems in Germany and Sweden 
 
 
 9 
2 Theoretical Framework 
 
 
At the beginning of this chapter the theories and concepts, creating the foundation 
of the thesis will be presented in order to make it easy for the reader to 
understand the following discussion and argumentation. The reader will then get 
familiar with the global corporate governance systems through a brief 
presentation. The emphasis of this chapter is however placed on the German and 
Swedish corporate governance systems, which are presented with emphasis on the 
four chosen aspects. Thereafter, the similarities and differences between Germany 
and Sweden on the aspects are concretised and hypotheses formulated. 
Additionally, the convergence issue will be discussed, i.e. earlier studies will be 
reviewed. The convergence theory will serve as a framework as it comes to 
possible future developments within the subject, but will not be central to the 
further reasoning in this thesis. The chapter concludes with a summary.  
 
 
 
2.1 The Foundation of Corporate Governance 
 
hrough the past years there have been a number of high profile corporate 
collapses which have arisen despite the fact that the annual report and 
accounts seemed to be in order (e.g. Enron, Barings Bank, Royal Ahold). These 
collapses have had enormous affects on many stakeholders and therefore raised 
questions as why such collapses occurred and how these can be prevented from 
happening again. The answers to these questions are linked to corporate 
governance. (Mallin 2004) 
 
The separation of ownership and control is lying at the centre of the agency theory 
and the corporate governance development. Smith (in Mallin 2004) introduced the 
potential problem of mangers watching over the money invested by other people 
with the same willingness as if it were their own. About one hundred years later 
was a study by Berle and Means (1932) conducted on the topic. The study 
conducted by Berle and Means in 1932 is often referred to as the classical study of 
ownership and control of corporations. They argue that the separation of 
ownership from control produces a condition where the interests of owners and 
ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge. Nevertheless, their work has been 
criticised by e.g. Zeitlin and Leech. (in Barca & Becht 2001) 
 
During the 80s the activity of financial markets boomed by a wave of financial 
innovations. From then on, the threats to poorly performing managers have 
T  
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become a reality, mainly through hostile takeovers; the ´Wall Street walk´ enabled 
multiple shareholders to regain control. The second element was that the 
institutional investors’ activism increased strongly in the US which gave the 
corporate governance debate a fast growing development in US and continued to 
spread to Europe. The UK was particularly the driving force of corporate 
governance in Europe, during the early 90s. (Rebérioux 2002; Kim & Nofsinger 
2004) In 1992 the Cadbury report was published in the UK and has had a great 
impact on corporate governance in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world 
(Mallin 2002). 
 
There is no one generally accepted definition of corporate governance; hence the 
official German and Swedish definitions follow: 
 
“Corporate governance is a term describing good, efficient management and 
supervision of companies on the basis of internationally recognised standards in 
the interests of the company’s owners and its social environment.” (Cromme 2005 
German Corporate Governance Code) 
 
“Corporate governance deals with the management of companies with a view to 
meeting the owners’ required return on invested capital and thus it contributes to 
economic growth and efficiency.” (Code of Swedish corporate governance 2004)  
 
The two definitions are formulated by the corporate governance committees of the 
two countries, appointed by respective government. As a consequence, the 
definitions are diverging. The most important difference between the two 
definitions is that the German definition states that corporate governance is 
supervision of the companies on an international basis while the Swedish 
definition has no such outward looking view. The fact that the two definitions 
diverge makes them unsuitable to use as impartial definitions in this thesis. Since 
our aim is to conduct this study in an as neutral and impartial way as possible, 
neither of the definitions is used here. The definition given by the OECD is used 
instead since it’s formulated by an organisation that is impartial of both Germany 
and Sweden. A turn towards either of the countries is thus argued to be avoided in 
largest possible extent. The OECD definition of corporate governance and the 
definition used here is the following: 
 
“Corporate governance is one key element in improving economic efficiency and 
growth as well as enhancing investor confidence. Corporate governance involves 
a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.” (OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance 2004) 
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Corporate Governance is a relatively new area for the public, and came into a 
large focus in the beginning of the 90s in Europe, although the development from 
corporate governance can be tracked long before that. This while it rests on old 
theories, first and foremost the agency theory, the transaction cost economics and 
the stakeholder theory. Below a short explanation of the theories follow, the aim 
is to create a broader, deeper and clearer understanding for the corporate 
governance we enjoy today. 
 
 
2.1.1 Theory Selection 
 
The three theories following below (Agency Theory, Transaction Cost Economics 
and Stakeholder Theory) are essential and fundamental in the development of the 
corporate governance (Mallin 2004). The theories will be outlined and explained 
in order to provide the reader a deeper understanding of the overall corporate 
governance. Thus, these theories are not of major importance in the analysis, 
concluding discussion and conclusions of the thesis. Studies conducted on the four 
selected aspects in the German and Swedish corporate governance systems are 
instead constructing the key basis of the study.  
 
 
2.1.1.1 Agency Theory 
 
As defined by the OECD above, corporate governance refers to the involvement 
of a set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its 
shareholders and other stakeholders. These relationships are linked to the 
“separation of ownership and control”, which is intimately associated with the 
agency theory. 
 
The agency theory is describing relationships between two parties, e.g. the 
shareholders (principal) and board management (agent) or employees (principal) 
and board management (agent). The principal-agent theory treats the difficulties 
that arise under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information. It’s when 
the principal compensates an agent for performing certain acts which are useful to 
the principal and costly to the agent that the problem occurs. (Nygaard & 
Bengtsson 2002) 
 
There are certain important conditions that are fundamental in the agency theory. 
First, the principal and the agent are utility maximisers. The following problem is 
that the agent won’t act in the way the principal wishes. Consequently, the agent 
wants a compensation for his/her contribution to the principal. Secondly, there are 
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conflicts of interests between the two parties which can be related to the welfare 
maximisation aspect recently pointed out. The third condition considers the 
principal’s lack of information, also referred to as asymmetric information, which 
means that decisions are being made on incomplete information. The 
shareholder/stakeholder has often difficulties with linking the performance to the 
compensation of the board members due to lack of sufficient information. 
(Nygaard & Bengtsson 2002) 
 
Other central conditions of the agency theory are the assumptions that the agent is 
opportunistic, limited rational and risk averse. The opportunistic actions, e.g. lies 
and deceive, can be committed before and after conducting a contract. The agent 
could in an opportunistic situation avoid publishing certain information or act 
passively. As the agents are risk averse they are requiring a higher compensation 
when they, according to their own opinion, are forced to commit an action 
involving higher risks. (Nygaard & Bengtsson 2002)  
 
Meanwhile there are elements of the agent’s performance which are costly to 
observe and the monitoring and bond costs (resource expenditures) arise. The 
solution to this information problem is the creation of contracts that are aiming to 
ensure (as far as possible) that agents act in the way principals wish them to do. In 
these contracts, the desired performance and the appropriate incentives or 
compensations will be defined. (Jensen & Meckling 1976) Moreover, the 
principal-agent problematic is closely related to the moral hazard problem3.  
 
Board directors are expected to act in the best interest of the corporation; 
consequently they are argued by Palmer and Hardy (2000) to have two 
fundamental duties. The first duty regards loyalty, which means that directors 
must adhere to a strict fiduciary pattern of behaviour whereby they always act in 
the best interest of the corporation. The second duty regards care, which also 
requires reasonable inquiry and monitoring of the corporation. The directors must 
implement procedures and make sufficient inquiry to assure that management is 
properly fulfilling its duties and react on issues and information vital to the 
corporation. (Palmer & Hardy 2000) 
 
The reviewed duties represent a complex relationship of parties, which point out 
that the board structures are essential in this context. The board is responsible for 
working in partnership with management to achieve corporate goals. One of their 
objectives is furthermore argued to be to assure that the value of the corporation is 
maximised over long term and directors work in the best interest of the 
shareholders (Shareholder-oriented system, e.g. UK/US). The board can 
                                                           
3 The increased risk of problematical (immoral) behavior, and thus a negative outcome ("hazard"), 
because the person who caused the problem doesn't suffer the full (or any) consequences, or may 
actually benefit. Common in the contractual commitments (Homepage of Wikipedia).  
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furthermore consider other stakeholders, e.g. employees, creditors, suppliers etc. 
(Stakeholder-oriented system, e.g. Germany and Sweden). (Palmer & Hardy 
2000) The principal-agent problematic is central in the corporate governance 
debate today, and thus is the foundation of the agency theory important in the 
following study. 
 
 
2.1.1.2 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
 
A transaction cost is a cost incurred in making an economic exchange. The 
transaction cost is often viewed as closely related to the agency theory (Mallin 
2002) and for that reason considered as important in the corporate governance 
context. 
 
Through Williamson (in Nygaard & Bentgsson 2002) the transaction cost 
economics became widely known. He got inspired by the work of Coase from 
1937, who at that time questioned why corporations exist when the perfect market 
exists. Coase (1937) argues that the transaction costs are low when well 
functioning exchanges of corporate activities exist. This regards the gathering of 
information about available alternatives; first to evaluate them and secondly to 
conclude contracts with them. There are economic benefits for the firm to 
undertake transaction internally than externally. Furthermore, the firm will 
become larger the more transactions it undertakes and the expansion will continue 
until it becomes cheaper or more efficient for the transactions to be undertaken 
externally. Moreover, he argues that firms may become less efficient the larger 
they become (Coase 1937) 
 
Williamson (in Nygaard & Bentgsson 2002) argues that corporations don’t have 
to become less efficient the larger they become since they can choose governance 
structure. His definitions of transaction costs are frequency, specificity, 
uncertainty, limited rationality, and opportunistic behaviour. The two last 
conditions are equivalent with those mentioned in the agency theory above. The 
solution of these problems is also similar to the agency theory which was to 
conduct contracts. Williamson has been criticised for his statement that the 
individuals are opportunistic and he has consequently changed his view to a 
certain extent, by arguing that the pure assumption that individuals are 
opportunistic make the corporation conduct contracts. He moreover argues that 
optimal contracts are not possible due to individuals’ limited rationality. The 
contracts are constructed to minimise the opportunism and moreover are these 
contracts to be monitored. The contracts do constantly have to be adjusted to the 
new conditions and environment taking place today, which is associated with 
costs that are to be called transaction costs according to Williamson. The 
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uncertainty is associated with the limited rationality, e.g. due to lack of 
information or opportunistic behaviour. (Williamson in Nygaard & Bengtsson 
2002) 
 
Frequency regards the amount of identical transactions in a time period. The more 
identical transactions take place in a current legal structure, the lower will the 
transaction cost be. The specificity means that an asset will become worth less 
when it will be used in a situation for which it wasn’t intended primarily. A 
relationship between two individuals/corporations is to a larger extent 
characterised by their mutual investments in specific assets. When conducting 
asset specific transactions is it highly probable that the cooperation will continue 
while they are fundamental for the choice of legal structure. (Williamson in 
Nygaard & Bengtsson 2002) 
 
A study conducted by Hart (1995) reveals that corporate governance structure 
matter in a world with incomplete contracts, and where agency problems exist. He 
argues that governance structure can be used as a mechanism for making 
decisions that haven’t been specified in the initial contract.  
 
The transaction theory presents, in relationship with the agency theory, a deeper 
understanding for costs, which are associated with activities internally in the 
corporation. The theories can moreover be linked to managerial direction and 
control. (Mallin 2004) 
 
 
2.1.1.3 Stakeholder Theory 
 
The stakeholder theory takes not only the shareholder into account but also a 
wider group of stakeholders. As originally detailed by Freeman (1984), 
stakeholder theory attempts to ascertain which groups are stakeholders in a 
corporation and thus deserve management attention. A later study conducted by 
Friedman and Miles (2002) find the implications of contentious relationships 
between stakeholders and organisations by introducing compatible and 
incompatible interests and necessary and contingent connections as additional 
attributes with which to examine the configuration of these relationships. They 
introduce a model which combines the stakeholder theory with realist theory of 
social change differentiation. In the conclusion they state that it’s important to 
map out the different stakeholders and their interests.  
 
Shareholders and stakeholders may favour different corporate governance 
systems. For example are the Anglo-Saxon systems more shareholder-oriented 
and the German system more stakeholder-oriented, where stakeholder groups like 
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employees and providers of credit get more attention. Furthermore are different 
monitoring mechanisms essential for the two different orientations.  
 
 
2.1.2 The Global Corporate Governance Systems 
 
The complexity of corporate governance can be explained through its global 
occurrence including different legal, cultural, ownership, and other structural 
differences. The theories that have affected the development of corporate 
governance should be viewed in combination with the legal system, capital market 
development and the ownership structure. (Mallin 2004) The various corporate 
governance systems within Europe function somewhat differently due to how 
national legal systems function. Germany has e.g. a well pronounced and 
established law4 of employee representation on the supervisory board. A similar 
law can on the other hand be found in Sweden, but it’s not as strictly legislated as 
in Germany. (Lewis et al. 2004; Swedish Code of Corporate Governance 2004) 
Germany has moreover developed banking systems while the country has strong 
legal protection of creditors, particularly of secured creditors. Without such legal 
rights German banks would have much less power in the German corporations. 
(La Porta et al. 2000)  
 
Among others Scott (1985), De Jong (1989), Moreland (1995) and Weimer (1995) 
proposed four groups of relative rich and industrialised countries where different 
global corporate governance systems can be identified (Weimer & Pape 1999): 
 
1) Anglo-Saxon countries (the USA, the UK, Canada and Australia) 
2) Germanic countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, 
Denmark, Norway and Finland) 
3)  Latin countries (France, Italy, Spain and Belgium) 
4)  Japan (which is considered as isolated) 
 
These four global corporate governance systems must not be mistaken for the 
corporate governance systems applied in the individual countries. We would 
therefore like to point out that the corporate governance systems presented here, 
and in which several countries are divided are named global corporate governance 
systems, e.g. the Germanic or Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems. The 
individual corporate governance systems applied e.g. in Germany and Sweden are 
on the other hand expressed as corporate governance systems in this thesis. As 
these somewhat confusing terms have been distinguished from each other, the 
global corporate governance systems will be presented below. 
                                                           
4 Mitbestimmungsgesetz 
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The Anglo-Saxon system is a market-oriented system which serves as a 
mechanism for independent shareholders to influence managerial decision-
making. The group-oriented system is the contradicting which characterises the 
Germanic system. The influence of the shareholder is strongly institutionalised in 
the Anglo-Saxon countries. This system has adopted a one-tier board of directors, 
i.e. executive and supervisory responsibilities of the board are condensed in one 
legal entity. The stock market plays an important role but the Anglo-Saxon system 
is primarily characterised by the external market for corporate control, also named 
as the takeover market. As a consequences is the ownership concentration referred 
to as low and the economic relationship are relatively short-term. 
 
When discussing the Germanic system, Germany is the country referred to 
although a range of smaller countries are divided into this system as well. 
Germany has a two tier board system, i.e. a management board (Vorstand) and 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). This dual system aims to separate management 
and the supervision of management.  The supervisory board is composed of 
employees and shareholders that can influence managerial decision making. The 
one share, one vote principle valid in the Anglo-Saxon system isn’t valid here. 
Companies in Germany can issue non-voting shares up to the amount of all 
issuing shares, and can so on limit the voting rights of the shareholders. The banks 
have an especially important role in Germany due to their large block holdings. 
The ownership concentration is consequently very high and the economic 
relationships are preferably long-term.   
 
The Latin system lies somewhere in between the Anglo-Saxon and the Germanic 
view. In France the companies can chose between one-tiered or two-tiered board 
systems. The French corporate law doesn’t distinguish between executive and 
non-executive directors on the management board. Shareholder influence is 
somewhat stronger then in the Germanic system, than but not as strong as in the 
Anglo-Saxon. Ownership concentration is generally high in the Latin system. 
Moreover, family owned corporations are very common, particularly in Italy and 
for that reason is the long-term economic relationship preferable. 
 
In the Japanese corporate governance system is the cultural dimension most 
dominant compared to the other corporate governance systems. Family and the 
importance of “achieving consensus” are the cultural aspects that are most central. 
The Japanese board system is rather complex, an informal substructure of the 
board of directors is often constructed. Similar to Germany are the banks and 
employees essential stakeholders. The Keiretsu (interoperate networks) and long-
term employment are especially important in this system.  
 
As discussed in chapter 1, the Swedish board structure is not the same as the 
German, as the one-tier system is applied in Sweden. This stresses the somewhat 
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unclear and problematic position of Sweden in the global corporate governance 
system. Moreover, frequent misunderstandings made in international studies, 
regarding the Swedish board structure exist. We argue that this can be possibly 
due to the small amount of studies conducted on the Swedish corporate 
governance system. The classification made by e.g. Albert-Roulhac and Breen 
(2005) is somewhat incorrect. They argue that Sweden has one executive and one 
non-executive board which are not correct, as a unitary board exists in Sweden 
(Mallin 2004).  
 
 
2.2 The Four Selected Aspects 
 
In the following sections, the corporate governance in Germany and Sweden will 
be presented, emphasising the four selected aspects. The ownership structure is 
studied due to the assumption that the role of traditional major owners is changing 
in Germany and in Sweden. Consequently, how and in which directions these 
changes take place is interesting to study for each individual country, as well as in 
relation to previous studies. The major owner types are as well originally 
somewhat different in the two systems. The second aspect, employee 
representation on the boards, is vital as it takes place in both countries but the 
legal constraints are diverging. As transparency is a key aspect of good corporate 
governance is the aspect of disclosing information in the corporations interesting. 
A new law regarding the disclosure of board members’ compensation was 
established in Germany in year 2005. Consequently, a research on the third aspect 
is relevant. The fourth and last aspect being studied; female directors on the 
boards, is one of the most recent and modern topics in the corporate governance 
debate. As Sweden, alongside with Norway, is considered being ahead of the rest 
of the world within this topic, a study of this aspect comparing Germany and 
Sweden can reveal interesting outcomes.  
 
The similarities and differences between the two countries concerning these four 
aspects will be studied and outlined in section 2.3, as the research hypotheses will 
be presented. However, the individual corporate governance systems in Germany 
and Sweden will first be presented. 
 
 
2.2.1 Corporate Governance in Germany 
 
Historically, the German corporate governance has emphasised cooperative 
relationships among banks, shareholders, boards, managers and employees in the 
interests of labour peace and corporate efficiency. In contrast to the Anglo-Saxon 
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system, the corporation is not seen as a shareholder value creating device, but 
rather an independent economic entity consulting a coalition of various 
participants. (Ziegler 2000) The German corporate governance system can 
therefore be seen as stakeholder oriented.  
 
The stock market plays a less important role in the German system compared with 
the Anglo-Saxon system, and an active external market for corporate control is 
almost non-existent. This can be explained through that companies are very 
densely held. The OECD (in Weimer & Pape 1999) approximates that the five 
largest shareholders in German corporations hold on average 41 % of the shares. 
This stands in contrast with the US and the UK where about 10 % is the 
comparable number.  About three powerful groups and influential stakeholders 
can be identified in the German corporate governance: block holders, employee 
and/or union representatives, and banks. (Hackethal et al. 2005) 
 
An important starting point when discussing the German corporate governance 
system is that Germany has a two-tiered board system; a management board and a 
supervisory board. All public limited companies (AG5) and private limited 
companies (GmbH6) with more than 500 employees have by law a management 
and a supervisory board. The management board is responsible for independently 
managing the corporation. Its members are jointly responsible for the 
management of the corporation. The task of the supervisory board is to advise 
regularly and supervise the members of the management board. The management 
board and the supervisory board cooperate closely to the benefit of the 
corporation. The management board informs and discusses issues of fundamental 
importance to the corporation with the supervisory board on a regular basis, i.e. 
the corporations strategic approaches, transactions of fundamental importance, 
risk situation, takeover offers etc. The supervisory board is composed of 
employees and shareholders that can influence managerial decision making. 
(Monks & Minow 2001; Weimer & Pape 1999)  
 
Summarising it appears that establishing long-term relationships seem preferable 
in the German corporate governance, due to sizeable and stable shareholdings by 
non-financial corporations and banks, similar to the institutionalised influence of 
employees. Furthermore, it can be stressed that the German corporate governance 
system is dominated by the role played by the supervisory board. (Mallin 2004; 
Cromme 2005) 
 
 
                                                           
5 Aktiengesellschaft (see Ashauer 1999 for more details) 
6 Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (see Ashauer 1999 for more details) 
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2.2.1.1 Ownership Structure 
 
The most influential shareholders in the German corporate governance system are 
financial and non-financial companies, and there are significant cross-holdings, 
i.e. one also needs to look at the links between companies. Through the cross 
holdings between banks and other financial intermediaries such as insurance 
companies, they can together own nearly a quarter of the share. The role of the 
banks is especially important in the German corporate governance. They are 
referred to as salient stakeholders, and apart from the classical role as suppliers of 
debt and other financial services their influence have two dimensions; equity 
ownership and supervisory board seats. The German corporate governance could 
consequently be classified as a ´insider´ system7. (Hackethal et al. 2005; Mallin 
2004; Weimer & Pape 1999) 
 
In many German companies, non-voting shares restrict the voting rights of the 
shareholder, which allows a few groups of owner to control the company (Monks 
& Minow 2001). The banks in Germany are controlled through proxy votes 
(Depotstimmrecht) which adds voting power to existing voting blocks. The proxy 
voting is used to concentrate voting power without concentrating ownership. This 
ensures market liquidity and impedes hostile takeovers. (Barca & Becht 2001) By 
larger corporations where not all shareholders are able to join the general 
assembly of shareholders (Hauptversammlung) can the shareholders be 
represented through, normally, a bank. In the most cases the shareholders abstain 
from their rights to give the banks their voting opinions8. Consequently, the banks 
have a very large influence in the German corporations as they often represent the 
majority of the share seats. (Ashauer 1999) 75 of Germany’s 84 largest companies 
have a bank representative on the supervisory board. Moreover, in 31 of these 
companies that representative is also the chairman of the supervisory board. 
(Monks & Minow 2001) Through the extensive information gained from their 
lending activities, banks gain valuable information that might not be available to 
other stakeholders. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that a company will 
disclose everything to the bank and that the bank will use the information wisely, 
which the Parmalat scandal demonstrate. (Mintz 2005) Adding the power of the 
proxy votes to the votes from direct ownership rights, the overall proportion of 
votes controlled by banks in the largest 100 firms in Germany is 36 %; and in the 
top 10 firms the control reaches over 50 % (Elston & Goldberg 2001).  
                                                           
7 The System is common in several Continental European countries, e.g. Germany and Sweden, 
where ownership is concentrated, allowing a few major owners control the corporation. (Mallin 
2004). In insider systems do the owners of larger firms, often banks, have a long-term relationship with 
the corporation, and close links with managers and thus access to internal information.  There is no 
active public takeover market acting as a market for corporate control. (Almond et al 2003; 
Hackethal et al 2005) 
8 ”Only 2-3 per cent of the individual depositor-shareholders exercise their right to tell the banks 
how to vote their shares”(Monks & Minow 2001). 
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The banks role has been highly criticised on a number of aspects. Banks are at the 
same time shareholders, representatives of other shareholders and creditors, which 
raise a number of problems due to conflicts of interest. The central and strong role 
of the banks in Germany is thus slowly decreasing. In 1998 the law Control and 
Transparency Law (KonTraG9) was introduced, which among others freed up the 
voting system. (Monks & Minow 2001)  
 
Bank activities and strategies are nowadays somewhat different compared with 
those during the 80s. The Banks have decreased their commercial loan business 
and increased investment bank activities. Large corporations, on which most of 
the corporate governance debate is focused, have become gradually more 
independent from long-term bank financing. These are some reasons for the 
decreasing role of the banks in Germany. (Hackethal et al. 2005; Jackson & 
Moerke 2005) 
 
Carati and Tourani Rad (2000) argue that a trend shift in the ownership structure 
in the group-based corporate governance system is taking place. The governments 
and non-financial companies reduce their involvement in non-core business 
sectors and institutional investors are taking up the released equity. The ownership 
structure is though remaining concentrated.  
 
 
2.2.1.2 Employee Representation on the Boards 
 
In corporations having more than 500 employees, employees are represented on 
the supervisory board. In corporations with employees 500 to 2000, the 
supervisory board has to be composed of one third of employee representatives, 
this according to the German co-determination Act (MitbestG10). The one third 
has moreover to be constructed of two third of the employees from the 
corporation and one third of union members. In corporations with more than 2000 
employees is the supervisory board composed of 50 % employee representatives 
and 50 % of shareholders. The chairman of the supervisory board has in this 
structure the casting vote in the case of split resolution. The employees´ right to 
participate in decision-making is called co-determination (Mitbestimmung11).  
 
The other members of the supervisory board are appointed by the general 
assembly of shareholders. The supervisory board is nominated for four years. For 
                                                           
9 Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich 
10 § 7 Mitbestimmungsgesetz 
11 Some clarification; here is the unternehmerische Mitbestimmung the one discussed, i.e. the 
composition on the supervisory boards in the AGs and GmbHs. The betrieblische Mitbestimmung, 
which isn’t to be mixed up with the one above, handles the relationship between employees and 
employer. (Ashauer 1999) 
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corporations with less than 500 employees the co-determination law is not 
compelling. (Kümmel & Saulgau 2002) The co-determination law is a debated 
topic in the German industry. The unions in Germany favour the co-determination 
rights, with following arguments: 1) Democracy of the economy; 2) Equality from 
work and capital; 3) Humanity of the working world; 4) Control of the economic 
power. These arguments are met by the business executives with following 
contrary arguments: 1) The co–determination law implies limitations of the 
fundamental rules (Eigentum, Vereingigungs- und Koalitionsfreiheit, freie 
Berufswahl und “Unternehmensfreiheit”); 2) It implies negative consequences on 
the competition, especially abroad as German companies can’t compete on equal 
terms with foreign companies; 3) It has negative consequences on the capital 
acquisition since foreign investors could be scared away; 4) The co-determination 
law has negative consequences for the competent corporation management. 
(Ashauer 1999) 
 
Based on the arguments put forward by the two parties it could be stated that the 
co-determination law has its advantages as well as its drawbacks. An established 
advantage is that the amount of disagreement between workers and employers 
leading to strikes has been minimised, which imply higher productivity. The 
disadvantages are not as established, but it’s suspected that the Co-determination 
Act could have negative effects on the competition, which the business executives 
also state. If these effects exist at all, they should be seen as of less importance 
than the wage levels and the qualifications of the workers. (Ashauer 1999) 
 
An article in the Economist (2005-01-29) is on the other hand more critical to the 
co-determination system in Germany. It’s argued that the co-determination is 
proving a hindrance these days when speed and flexibility are essential in the 
global competition. 
 
 
2.2.1.3 Disclosure of Board Members’ Compensation 
 
An individual disclosure of board members’ salaries and compensations hasn’t 
been legislated in Germany until July last year when the upper house of the 
German parliament (Bundesrat) finally approved legislation on the issue 
(Homepage of Bundesministerium der Justiz; FAZ 2005-07-08).  The new 
founded law (VorstOG12) will regard 1000 German firms, quoted on the stock 
exchange, and will be applied as from the beginning of year 2006. These firms 
will be obligated to disclose the salaries and bonuses of all members of the 
management board on individual basis. Furthermore, disclosure of compensations 
                                                           
12 Vorstandsvergütungs- Offenlegungsgesetz 
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of formerly board members is also comprised by this law. Worth noting is that a 
firm can evade the law when Shareholders vote with a 2/3 majority on the 
shareholders’ general meeting and this resolution can be valid for five years. 
(VorstOG13) The law is aiming to increase transparency and control rights for and 
exercised by shareholders. Although the German corporate governance code says 
that the compensations for the members of the management board should be 
presented in the notes of the consolidated financial statements (the figures should 
be individualised), have few German corporations complied with that. The 
compensation for the members of the supervisory board should according to the 
Code also be published individually, but in the corporate governance report. 
(German Corporate Governance Code 2005) 
 
However, the German corporate law (AktG14), until recently, only prescribed that 
an aggregate figure for the board as a whole should be published. As a result, 
most companies defy the Code, despite signing up for it in 2002, and refuse to 
publish individualised figures. This makes Germany to one of the laggards among 
Europe’s developed countries. (The Economist 2004-08-21) An important aspect 
here is that the individual shareholder has difficulties to asses the link between 
performance and compensation of the board members. The formally law of 
disclosing the aggregate compensation of board members and management, which 
was according to German corporate law to be included in the annual report, does 
not include all non-cash elements of the compensation. Furthermore, most 
German chairmen don’t find disclosure of management compensation necessary; 
only 45 % are in favour of such a proposal (Peck & Ruigrok 2000). 
 
 
2.2.1.4 Female Directors on the Boards 
 
According to a study conducted by Jayne (2005), only 10 % of board seats were 
taken by women. Female representation seems to be a silent topic in the corporate 
governance in Germany, more focus is brought to the board structure, large block 
holdings by banks, employee representation etc. There are no law or proposition 
of legislating female representation on the boards in Germany at the moment. In 
the German corporate law (§100AktG) is the personal conditions/qualification 
described for the supervisory board member.  The paragraph notifies that a 
member of the board has to be a natural person. The person is allowed to take 
seats not more than 10 supervisory board seats. Moreover is it forbidden to take 
seats in a corporation’s supervisory board when a member of the management 
board in the corporation also takes seats in the other corporation 
                                                           
13 § 286 Absatz 4 b Vorstandsvergütungs- Offenlegungsgesetz 
14 § 87 Absatz 1 Aktiengesetz 
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(Überkreuzungsverpflechtung). Similar reasoning follows the subsidiary and 
parent company relationship. Female directors or representation from other 
minorities is not mentioned in this paragraph. 
 
In the law of one third representation of employees on the supervisory boards 
(Drittelbeteiligungsgesetz § 415), it is stated that the board should be composed of 
both women and men, in proportion to the percentage of women/men in the 
corporation. Tough this law is not compelling there are no evidences that the 
employee representatives have a fair gender distribution on the board.    
 
 
2.2.2 Corporate Governance in Sweden 
 
Limited liability companies are obliged to have a board of directors (Styrelse), 
which then appoints a managing director, e.g. a CEO. The day-to-day 
management of the company is carried out by the managing director, however 
being subordinate to the board. According to the Swedish code of corporate 
governance should the board of directors be of a size and composition that enables 
it to fulfil its tasks. The tasks consist of taking the responsibility for the 
company’s organisation and the management of the company’s affairs. The rights 
of the board are though limited by the shareholders’ meeting (Bolagsstämman), 
where the shareholders exercise their power. The shareholders’ meeting is the 
highest decision-making body in Swedish corporations, for example issuing 
instructions to the board and electing the company’s board of directors as well as 
the company’s auditors. (Swedish code of corporate governance 2004) 
 
Until the Swedish corporate governance code was published in 2004, the 
governance of Swedish corporations was regulated by the Swedish Companies 
Act (Aktiebolagslagen). It regulates, to a certain extent, matters that are regulated 
by e.g. codes in other countries. As it comes to matters not regulated by the 
Companies Act, Swedish corporations have been self-regulating. (Swedish Code 
of Corporate Governance 2004)  
 
The in the US and UK already during the 80s so animated corporate governance 
debate came to Sweden first in 1993, as the Volvo-Renault deal placed corporate 
governance at the top of the agenda. The reason was the internal disagreements 
within the Volvo management, causing an intervention from the side of the largest 
owner institutions. (SOU 2004:47). During the same year, the Swedish 
Shareholder Association (Aktiespararna) published their guidelines for corporate 
governance of companies listed at the Stockholm Stock Exchange (Homepage of 
                                                           
15 DrittelbG § 4: (4) „Unter den Aufsichtsratsmitgliedern der Arbeitnehmer sollen Frauen und 
Männer entsprechend ihrem zahlenmäßigen Verhältnis im Unternehmen vertreten sein“.  
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ECGI). This was the first corporate governance policy and one of the first 
contributions to the corporate governance debate in Sweden.  
 
 
2.2.2.1 Ownership Structure 
 
Sweden has a market structure where formal institutions and governance systems 
are rather weak and imposes few constraints (Lubatkin et al. 2005). The 
separation of ownership and control is strong while the minority investors are 
weakly protected formally (Barca & Becht 2001). This favours a few major 
owners, able to control the Swedish listed companies to a large extent thanks to 
the very rare combination of dual-class shares and pyramid holdings, i.e. closed-
end investment funds (Lubatkin et al. 2005; Barca & Becht 2001; La Porta et al. 
2001).  
 
The empowerment of the owners theoretically enables them to exploit the 
minority shareholders since the legal protection of their rights is weak. The strong 
enforcement and transparency in combination with the high social pressure 
characterising the Swedish market is however preventing them from doing so. 
Another drawback of the combination of dual-class shares and pyramids is a loss 
of dynamic between ownership and control. This leads to a lock-in effect where 
“transfer of control becomes excessively costly and painful”. As a result, many 
Swedish companies have the same institutions as their major owners for very long 
times. (Barca & Becht 2001)  
 
These major owners holds large amounts of A-shares, which carries 10 or 100 
votes each while B-shares only carries one, enabling them to remain in control of 
the companies, but let others finance them. (Almond et al. 2003; Barca & Becht 
2001) The most powerful owners in Sweden are two pyramid holding companies, 
which is a result of the Bank Law established in 1934. The Swedish banks had 
before their establishment been important shareholders, which now was 
prohibited. The banks thus created holding companies that took over the portfolios 
and the two most powerful pyramid-holding companies; Investor and 
Industrivärden, were grounded. Investor was organised by SE-Banken and 
controlled by the Wallenberg sphere through the Wallenberg foundations, which 
still is the case today. The other very important pyramid holding company is 
Industrivärden, which was organised by Handelsbanken and was and still is 
controlled institutionally, i.e. the top executives of Handelsbanken control it. 
These holding companies are playing an important role at the Swedish stock 
exchange due to their possessions of considerable amounts of A-shares. (Barca & 
Becht 2001; Collin 1998)  
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In order to decrease the importance of the major owners has the vote 
differentiation been limited to a maximum of 1:10, when issuing new shares. This 
is also the most common ratio (Almond et al. 2005). Yet a few very old shares 
constitute an exception, carrying 100 votes each. A-shares with as much as 1000 
votes each existed until the autumn 2004. Ericsson was by then the only company 
with this extraordinary high vote differentiation and decided to change it to the 
more ordinary 1:10. (Barca & Becht 2001; Dagens Industri 2006-02-20) Non-
voting shares may not be issued in Sweden (Swedish Code of Corporate 
Governance 2004). 
 
According to a study conducted by Barca and Becht (2001), the average largest 
shareholders in Sweden are controlling 47 % more votes than their proportion of 
capital contribution. In their study, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) found that 
foreign investors tend to underweight firms with dominant owners, suggesting 
that foreign investors dislike the dual-class share system implemented in Sweden. 
As foreign investors are an important financial force in the Swedish market, their 
attitude puts the Swedish companies under pressure, making them change 
(Dahlquist & Robertsson 2001). Barca and Becht (2001) are as well stating that 
the Swedish system is disliked by foreign investors and that a change thus is in 
progress. 
 
 
2.2.2.2 Employee Representation on the Boards 
 
As a result of the Social Democratic government, employees have the right to 
appoint representatives to the board of directors in companies quoted in Sweden. 
According to the Board Representation Act (lagen om styrelserepresentation för 
de privatanställda), employees in corporations with at least 25 employees, have 
the right to appoint two representatives and two deputies. More representatives, 
i.e. three representatives and three deputies, can only be appointed if the company 
has activities in several lines of businesses and at least 1000 employees. (SFS 
1987:1245) However, the Swedish Code of Corporate Governance constraints the 
right of employees to appoint representatives through stating that employee 
representatives never may constitute a majority on the board. (Randøy & Nielsen 
2002; Swedish Code of Corporate Governance) 
 
Levinson (2001) has studied how well the representation of employees function 
on company boards and found that it is generally well-functioning, even if it is the 
owner representatives and the managing directors who are taking care of the most 
important issues. He states that employee representatives in Sweden demonstrate 
a good capability to co-operate with the corporate leaders. According to him, this 
makes the co-determination to simultaneously benefit the company and the 
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unions. This means that representation of employees on the boards can “contribute 
such values as trust and joint solutions to management problems”. (Levinson 
2001) 
 
 
2.2.2.3 Disclosure of Board Members’ Compensation 
 
The long-term social democratic government of Sweden has led to a norm of 
equality, which permeates the country. This has resulted in a highly progressive 
tax structure and there through an income distribution being one of the highest in 
the Western World. (Lubatkin et al. 2005) The results of the Swedish tax policy 
and the equality norm, leading to a high social pressure, are highly visible when 
reviewing the compensation of Swedish CEOs. Swedish CEOs made on average 
twelve times more than employees in 1999, while their European counterparts 
made between 11 and 24 times more than the employees and CEOs in the US had 
salaries being 475 times higher than the average employee salaries. To 
summarise, it can be said that Sweden is characterised by “economic 
transparency, high taxes and an extensive public sector”. (Randøy & Nielsen 
2002)  
 
The strong norm of transparency has resulted in the right of public access to 
official records (offentlighetsprincipen), which according to the 2nd chapter 1 § in 
the press libel decree (tryckfrihetsförordningen) aims to “favour a free debate and 
an all-around information, whereby every Swedish citizen should have the right to 
have access to official documents”16 (Homepage of the Swedish Government; 
Homepage of the Swedish court organisation). This means that the compensation 
of board members in Sweden is public information. In what way a company 
compensates its board members is often made public in the firms’ annual report. 
A legal obligation to disclose the individual compensations is however not 
established. The Swedish minister of justice, supported by the committee of 
Swedish corporate governance, thus presented a law proposition in February 
2006. Their aim is to enlarge the stakeholders’ insight and understanding of the 
compensation programs of Swedish companies. (The Swedish Government)  
 
Muller (1999) reveals that there is a strong development toward decentralisation 
and individualisation of pay in the Swedish system, despite the fact that onetime 
bonuses are usually not paid in Sweden. Oxelheim and Randøy (2005) have 
however identified a tendency for the design of board members’ compensation to 
                                                           
16 "Till främjande av ett fritt meningsutbyte och en allsidig upplysning skall varje svensk 
medborgare ha rätt att taga del av allmänna handlingar" 
(2 kap. 1 § tryckfrihetsförordningen, som enligt 14 kap. 5 § som regel även gäller utlänningar.). 
Exists since 1766 
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be influenced by the American compensation system, leading to an increasing 
amount of bonus systems and onetime bonuses. 
 
 
2.2.2.4 Female Directors on the Boards 
 
The percentage of board seats occupied by women in the companies listed on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange is a highly debated issue in Sweden. The equality 
norm and women’s significant role in the market has led not only to an animated 
debate, but also to an engagement in the issue from the side of the Swedish 
government. In 2002, the Swedish minister for gender equality 
(jämställdhetsminister) stated that the government would legislate a quota of 
female directors on boards if the companies did not reach a ratio of 25 % by the 
end of 2004 (Svenska Dagbladet 2005-06-11). Despite a failure of the listed 
companies to reach this ratio, legislation has still not been published in the spring 
2006. However, a considerable amount of women where promoted to board 
directors during the period 2002-2004.  
 
The investigator of allocation of quotas, Catarina af Sandeberg, says that the 
required rate of at least 40 % female directors on boards might get lowered for 
some corporations and higher for other, due to the number of board seats and firm 
size. On the 1st of June 2006 will her investigation report be sent to the 
Government Offices of Sweden (Regeringskansliet) and thereafter will the report 
be for consideration, which normally take a couple of months. (Dagens Industri 
2006-05-03)  
 
 
2.3 Research Hypotheses 
 
When reviewing the literature, a focus on the four aspects analysed is sited in this 
thesis, namely the ownership structure, employee representation on the boards, 
disclosure of board members’ compensation and female directors on the boards. 
These aspects will be discussed and comparisons of Germany with Sweden will 
be made. The research questions, formulated as hypotheses, will be presented, 
forming the platform of the study. 
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2.3.1 Ownership Structure 
 
Today a new economic convention is recognised worldwide; the corporation, as 
diverged to the government, is the major driver of economic growth, wealth 
creation and technological innovations. A widespread privatisation of 
corporations has located the successful corporations on the positions where they 
are today. The large corporations can no longer afford to compete only in their 
own domestic markets, and hence numerous of cross-boarder consolidations, (e.g. 
Eon/Sydkraft), have been observed in the last decade. This stresses the fact that 
governments are less willing to protect national corporations from takeovers. 
(Monks & Minow 2001) 
 
The ownership structure in Germany as well as in Sweden is characterised by a 
concentrated ownership. Institutional investors are dominating both markets, but 
the major institutional owners differ. Banks normally have an important role in 
the German companies since they are debt suppliers, possess major shareholdings, 
in addition often even representing minority shareholders and there through 
having the majority of the share seats on the supervisory board (Ashauer 1999; 
Almond et al. 2003). The importance of the banks has resulted in long and close 
relationships between the banks and the listed companies in Germany (e.g. 
Almond et al. 2003; Hackethal et al. 2005; Lubatkin et al. 2005). This is however 
not a guarantee that the banks will receive and/or use the information in a correct 
way (Mintz 2005). The important role of the banks and other financial institutions 
is thus changing in the German corporate governance system (Monks & Minow 
2001; Jackson & Moerke 2005; Hackethal et al. 2005). Hackethal et al. (2005) in 
addition argue that the role of the banks is changing, which has resulted in 
reduced participation in non-financial companies. The overly complex web of 
participations within the financial sector itself has become more unravelling in the 
last years. However, they stress that the changing role of the major owners in 
Germany has not changed to a larger extent. 
 
In Sweden, on the other hand, are the major owners; families17, interest spheres18 
and foreign investors19. The Swedish companies are densely held by these owners, 
possessing A-shares. The dual-class share system is however disliked by the 
foreign investors who are not used to it and seldom get the opportunity to buy A-
shares. In addition, the system is associated with high costs for raising funds. As a 
result, some of the largest Swedish firms have converted to a one-share-one-vote 
                                                           
17 Included in this group are individuals and families that have founded the company or acquired 
control over a company (Sundin & Sundqvist in Barca & Becht 2001). 
18 Firms controlled by a group of shareholders sharing interests are divided into this category 
(Sundin & Sundqvist in Barca & Becht 2001).  
19 This group consists of all companies controlled by a foreign investor, independent of what kind 
of investor it is (Sundin & Sundqvist in Barca & Becht 2001). 
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system, suggesting that the increased involvement of foreign investors on the 
Swedish market has caused a slow system change. The maximum voting 
differential has for example been reduced from 1:1000 to 1:10, even if old shares 
carrying larger voting differentials still are permitted. (Barca & Becht 2001) Thus, 
studies (e.g. Almond et al. 2003; Barca & Becht 2001) imply that the role of the 
major owners is changing, which leads to the hypothesis that: 
 
Hypothesis 1 a): The role of major owners is changing. 
Consequently, the role of banks and financial 
institutions as owners will be emphasised in 
the debate in German media. 
 
Hypothesis 1 b): The role of major owners is changing. 
Consequently, the role of interest spheres and 
families will be emphasised in the debate in 
Swedish media. 
 
 
2.3.2 Employee Representation on the Boards 
 
According to German and Swedish law, the employees in Germany and Sweden 
have the right to have representatives on the supervisory board and the board of 
directors, respectively. In Germany, employee representatives20 must possess one 
third to one half of the seats on the supervisory board in corporations with more 
than 500 or 2000 employees (Kümmel & Saulgau 2002). The unions are powerful 
in both countries and protect the employees’ rights. Lewis et al. (2004) have 
identified possible advantages of employee involvement. These are; better 
decisions can be made, the implementation is more successful, needs like 
creativity and respect are satisfied, loyalty is increased etc.  In addition, 
employees help monitoring the mangers, who would otherwise not work in the 
best interest of the shareholders (Lewis et al. 2004). German employees are hence 
undoubtedly gained by the co-determination, but which effects the co-
determination has on the German corporations is less clear. An article in the 
Economist (2005-01-29) is critical to the co-determination system in Germany. 
It’s argued that the co-determination is proving a hindrance these days when 
speed and flexibility are essential to global competition. Common disadvantages 
are possibly; slow decision-making, workers are less informed than managers, 
participation is time consuming, retraining of mangers and employees can be 
expensive etc. (Lewis et al. 2004).  
 
 
                                                           
20 Workforce representatives (2/3) and union representatives (1/3) (MitbestG 7 §) 
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To be an employee representative is a difficult task, patronising the employees of 
the company simultaneous as the company itself. To which extent this is possible 
and which consequences the German companies takes as a result of the co-
determination are issues currently debated in Germany. McDonnell (in Mintz 
2005) supports employee governance as a way to ensure that corporations are 
governed in part in the interests of employees. He believes that employee 
involvement in corporate governance can work as a potentially powerful 
additional mechanism to control managerial opportunism and to direct the 
corporation towards greater efficiency. Rebérioux (2002) concludes in his study 
that shareholder value doesn’t lead to an optimal way to govern corporations. He 
states that the dynamics of corporate and labour law is underestimated on both 
national and international level. Furthermore, the corporate and labour law help 
shaping the corporate governance systems today.  Boatright (2004) deals with 
whether employee governance conflicts with shareholder governance and 
concludes that these two forms of governance are not conflicting. Instead, they are 
“complementary and mutually beneficial”.  
 
Even though the Swedish employees, like the German employees, can have 
representatives and are supported by unions, these rights are not as limiting as 
they are in Germany. Swedish employees have the right to appoint representatives 
in small companies as well as in companies having 25 employees or more 
(Swedish code of corporate governance 2004). This is however not a legal 
obligation as it is in Germany, but a right that the employees possesses, which 
results in a weaker position for the Swedish employees. The two countries also 
have cultural differences which have frequently been initiated (Hofstede; Ronen; 
Trompenaars; in Muller 1999). For example, Trompenaars’ findings suggest that 
Sweden's business culture is much closer to one of the United States than those of 
Germany. Based upon the current debates in the two countries; the second 
hypothesis states the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Co-determination will be debated in German media  
  more frequently than in Swedish. 
 
 
2.3.3 Disclosure of Board Members’ Compensation 
 
Transparency and disclosure is key aspects of good corporate governance. As a 
result, all corporate governance codes aims to ease and improve the disclosure of 
information to shareholders. One important aspect is to disclose the individual 
compensation21 of board members to help the shareholders take correct decisions 
                                                           
21 Compensation is here defined as the base salary as well as bonuses, stock options, stock grants 
and other benefits (Mallin 2002) 
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and prevent the board members from acting in a way that is not in favour of the 
company. According to the new law of disclosure the compensation of 
management boards and the German corporate governance code are the 
compensations for the members of the management and supervisory board to be 
presented as individualised figures in the consolidated financial statements and the 
corporate governance report, respectively. However, the German corporate law 
(AktG22) until last year only prescribed that an aggregate figure for the board as a 
whole is to be published. As a result, most companies have defied the Code, 
despite signing up for it in 2002, and refuse to publish individualised figures. This 
makes Germany to one of the laggards among Europe’s developed countries. (The 
Economist 2004-08-21) An important aspect here is that the individual 
shareholder has difficulties to asses the link between performance and 
compensation of the board members.  
 
The disclosure of aggregate compensation of board members and management 
(which according to German corporate law was to be included in the annual 
report) didn’t include all non-cash elements of the compensation. Furthermore, 
most German chairmen don’t find disclosure of management compensation 
necessary; only 45 % are in favour of such a proposal (Peck & Ruigrok 2000). 
This, in combination with German custom, has made the compensation of board 
members to an important and highly debated issue in Germany. In a study 
conducted by v. Werder et al. (2005), it’s found that German companies are 
willing to accept and comply with the prescriptions of the Code generally, but 
unwilling to accept the recommendations of individual disclosure of the 
compensation of board members. Since there’s a well-established custom in 
Germany, not to disclose individual incomes, this is not surprising, especially as it 
is documented that Germany is changing slowly (e.g. Albert-Roulhac & Breen 
2005). But since it now has been legislated must all German companies quoted on 
the stock exchange disclose the compensation on individual basis, which will first 
be observed in spring 2007, when the annual reports will be distributed for the 
fiscal year 2006. 
 
Since disclosure of this sort of information is custom in Sweden due to the right of 
public access to official records, this is not an especially sensitive topic for the 
Swedish companies, but a normal procedure. Despite that, it can not be excluded 
that debates about the compensation of board members’ will not be observed in 
the Swedish media. Our third hypothesis is therefore as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 3a): The disclosure of individual compensations of 
board members will be debated in the German 
media due to the new law and therefore will the 
origin of the debate be political. 
                                                           
22 § 87 Absatz 1 Aktiengesetz 
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Hypothesis 3b): In Sweden, the compensation levels will be debated 
as legal constraints already exist. Consequently, the 
origin of the Swedish debate will be rooted in media 
and the industry. 
 
 
2.3.4 Female Directors on the Boards 
 
The question of female directors on the board of directors is a fairly new issue in 
corporate governance. During the last few decades, the proportion of women in 
the Swedish workforce has increased as the Social Democrats have enabled 
women being mothers to work through a well-organised day care. This was 
important during the 70s, when Sweden needed to expand its workforce, therefore 
starting to apply an individual taxonomy for married couples, making it 
favourable for the women to work. A higher share of women in the workforce 
together with a high percentage of well-educated women has led to a situation 
where the percentage of women being potential manager candidates increases. 
Logically seen, this in turn will lead to a change in the composition of the boards, 
involving more women. (Erhardt et al. 2003)  
 
In Sweden and Norway it is thus argued that it’s just as important that the boards 
represent the company as a whole as it is to have employee representatives etc. 
This development in the Nordic countries is ahead of the rest of the world. 
Norway is the first country in the world to legislate that 40 % of the board 
members are to be women and the Swedish government has threatened to legislate 
as well. If legislation is the correct way to tackle the problem is however 
questionable. Are women employed on a quota-base going to be treated as equals 
by the others? What are these women expected to achieve for the company in the 
name of their gender? Should 50 % of the citizens be treated as a minority just 
because they are a minority on the boards or should the society/industry solve this 
problem on their own? In an article in Dagens Industri (2006-06-08) it was argued 
that media’ publication of corporations presenting a low percentage quota of 
female directors on the boards can have larger effects than a law and/or 
punishment fee on the issue.  
 
Burke (2003) stresses that it’s unlikely that other countries will follow the Nordic 
lead and establish laws; regulating the percentage of female directors on the 
boards. Jayne (2005) found that the proportion of women slowly increase in the 
boardrooms. Sweden introduced a policy in 2002, mandating publicly-listed 
companies to increase the percentage of female board members from 8 % to 25 % 
by 2004. The country's deputy prime minister said that otherwise, the process for 
women to reach 50 % would take 150 years at current speed. Sweden contrast 
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strongly with Spain and Italy where boardrooms remain an almost exclusively 
male sphere. Germany and the UK hold the middle ground where women occupy 
about 10 % of board seats compared with 8 % of directorships held in Europe's 
top 200 companies. (Jayne 2005) 
 
The societal development in Germany differs from that in Sweden. The day-care 
services are not as extended as in Sweden, resulting in a higher percentage of 
housewives. Other interesting difference between the two countries concerns the 
united or separate tax declaration of married couples. In Sweden was the tax 
declaration combined until year 1970, i.e. from 1971 is the tax declaration 
conducted separately. 
 
Carter et al. (2003) examined the relationship between board diversity and firm 
value, defining board diversity as the percentage of women, African Americans, 
Asians and Hispanics on the board of directors. They found a significant positive 
relationship between percentage of women or minorities and firm value. The 
proportion of women and minorities increases with firm size and board size and 
on the other hand decrease when number of insiders increase.  (Carter et al. 2003) 
In addition, Shrader et al. (1997) investigated how the proportion of women in 
management positions influenced the financial performance of the firm. They 
found that companies are influenced positively by a high share of women in 
management positions. However, high percentages of women on the boards had 
no significant impact on the financial performance. 
 
Burke & Vannicombe (2005) found that the slow progress made by talented, 
educated, ambitious women is now having some negative effects on women’s 
views of management and the professions as a career opportunity. Senior 
management women tend to leave traditional organisations to become 
entrepreneurs. Moreover, organisations are facing an approaching shortage of 
qualified leaders. Burke (2003) argues that there appears to be a shortage of 
qualified and committed directors capable of increasing the number of qualified 
women on the boards. 
 
Brenner and Schwalbach (2003) analysed the employment of female managers in 
their study and found a strong discrimination against female managers and that 
primarily large corporations are employing women in Germany. The German 
government has not taken any actions to promote female directors on the boards 
of German companies (Jayne 2005), implying that the issue is considered as of 
less importance in Germany compared to Sweden. Based on this, the fourth 
hypothesis states that: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Female directors on the board of directors is debated  
                       in Swedish media more frequently than in German. 
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2.4 Is a Convergence to a Single Corporate Governance 
System Possible? 
 
The world of today is characterised by globalisation and increased financial 
flexibility. Companies operating globally are not something unusual, which means 
that it is common that companies are active within more than one of the corporate 
governance groupings. This leads to weakened boarders between the groups as 
e.g. board members represents different corporate governance systems and views. 
The globalisation of the (corporate governance) world has therefore resulted in a 
debate among the researchers of whether the corporate governance systems are 
converging and if it is at all possible to converge them to a single system. Carati 
and Tourani Rad (2000), for example, are of the opinion that the group based 
corporate governance system worked well in times of strong economic growth, 
segmented financial markets and local competition in the economies of 
continental Europe and Japan. On the other hand, they state that the product and 
financial market globalisation today are questioning the effectiveness of this 
system in the new economic environment.  
 
Lewis et al. (2004) agree that the globalisation and the followed increased flow of 
capital across boarders and growth of international investors are powerful forces 
pushing for a convergence, but mean that the diversity of governance structures 
and the difference in employee participation across EU-countries makes a 
convergence difficult and possibly costly. Mintz (2005) takes it even further and 
states that a true convergence of the corporate governance systems is impossible, 
given the differences in underlying financing and cultural variables in countries 
such as the US and UK, and Germany. 
 
As it comes to Germany, Ziegler (2000) is of the opinion that the German 
corporate governance is under pressure and that it will be forced to change in the 
future due to its inefficiency. Hackethal et al. (2005) argue that the main 
characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still more or less 
the same, despite the important reforms and substantial changes of individual 
elements in their corporate governance system. The role of the big universal banks 
in corporate governance has changed substantially in the last years. These 
developments are often assumed to shift Germany towards the Anglo-Saxon 
model. However, a transition towards a more modern capital market-based 
outsider system (the US/UK) is according to Hackethal et al. (2005) not yet in 
sight and the function of the co-determination has not changed during the past 
decade. The co-determination23 applied in Germany is a powerful hindrance for a 
transition of the German corporate governance to a converged system, according 
                                                           
23 a guiding principle of German corporate governance since 1951 
International Corporate Governance 
A Comparison of the Corporate Governance Systems in Germany and Sweden 
 
 
 35
to the Economist (2005-01-29). Yet, until 2003, the year when the German 
corporate governance Code published, any talk of its abolition was unthinkable. 
 
However, Almond et al. (2003) is of the opinion that Germany is slowly changing 
from the insider towards the outsider model. Several large German firms have 
merged with Anglo-Saxon companies, thus shifting the power structure. 
Compared with other countries however, Germany remains distinctively an 
insider system. In recent years, the banks have tended to give up their role as a 
barrier against hostile takeovers. The ownership structure, the cross-
shareholdings, the co-determination and the two-tier board structure are effective 
barriers against hostile takeovers as well. (Almond et al. 2003) 
 
The convergence aspect has been debated by Carati and Tourani Rad (2000) as 
well. They reveal that the group-based corporate governance system (e.g. 
Germany) has converged in three aspects. Firstly, the financial markets have 
become more sophisticated in the 90s. The equity ownership structure, on the 
other hand, has remained concentrated. Nevertheless, observed is that non-core 
shareholdings, an essential element of the traditional group-based corporate 
governance system, are being unwounded in Germany and France Secondly, the 
market for corporate control has become more active. Thirdly, a larger focus on 
the creation of shareholder value has been put. The evidence presented here 
indicates large increases in privatisation and divestiture activities in Germany and 
France, both representing an increased focus on shareholder value in the group-
based corporate governance system. 
 
Pollin and Vaubourg (2005) believe that a convergence to a united and unique 
corporate governance model would be harmful for the performance of the 
economies in Europe.   
 
As indicated by the arguments presented above, the large interest in the 
convergence issue has resulted in a great amount of studies. The diversity of 
corporate governance in the non-English-speaking world is however less well 
understood (Jackson & Moerke 2005) as the English-speaking. The results of the 
studies conducted so far are somewhat mixed and new questions emerge 
constantly. 
 
 
2.5 Summary 
 
In this chapter it was stated that corporate governance can’t be defined by one 
single definition, but each country has its own definition. Nevertheless, corporate 
governance in this study is defined according to the definition of OECD. The 
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basic problem within corporate governance is the principal-agent problematic, 
which has been discussed as well as the transaction cost economics and 
stakeholder theory. As the basis for the topic corporate governance had been 
outlined, was the focus turned towards how different countries manage it. Four 
different global corporate governance systems were presented and Germany and 
Sweden got divided into the Germanic corporate governance system according to 
(among others): Scott; De Jong; Moreland and Weimer (in Weimer & Pape 1999). 
 
The specific outline of the corporate governance systems of Germany and Sweden 
were consequently presented with emphasis on the four chosen aspects; ownership 
structure, employee representation on the boards, disclosure of board members’ 
compensation, and female directors on the boards. As these aspects had been 
presented were the two systems compared with each other and four hypotheses 
were finally formulated. These four hypotheses are creating the basis of the study. 
The chapter was then concluded by a discussion, based on previous studies, 
concerning a possible convergence between the different corporate governance 
systems. 
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3 Methodology 
 
 
This chapter aims to declare the method selection with emphasis on the content 
analysis method. The code manual and the accomplishment of the coding is 
explained and described in order to make the reader as initiated as possible in the 
applied method. The course of action used to conduct the study is outlined to 
explain the way the method is applied and in that way enhance the possibilities to 
replicate the study. A discussion of the reliability and validity of the thesis will 
conclude the chapter. 
 
 
3.1 Method Selection 
 
he purpose of the thesis is, as mentioned in chapter 1, to investigate four 
aspects of corporate governance in Germany and Sweden. The study is 
accomplished through a deductive reasoning. The four aspects have been 
formulated to hypotheses in chapter 2 and these hypotheses will be examined in 
order to achieve the purpose of the thesis. As stressed in chapter 1 does media 
have an important role in the corporate governance debate and for that reason will 
a content analysis on two chosen daily newspapers be accomplished. The choice 
to conduct a content analysis is additionally based upon the fact that a quantitative 
method is the most suitable method for this kind of study since it is based on a 
standardised collection (hypotheses) of a large amount of data (Jacobsen 2002). 
Before continuing with the analysis and conclusion the results from the 
examination of the hypotheses will be run through the statistical program SPSS.  
 
 
3.1.1 Media and Time Period 
 
The chosen media sources for the study are the following two newspapers: Die 
Welt (Germany) and Svenska Dagbladet (Sweden). They were chosen while they 
have a nation-wide coverage and are published on a daily basis. The newspapers 
illustrate an estimated equally large emphasis on financial/business news and have 
an excellent reputation. The limitation of only analysing one newspaper per 
country is done to keep a controllable dimension on the study, guaranteeing that 
it’s practicable. Additional newspapers would of course enlarge the reliability of 
the study, but the results wouldn’t be different in any larger extent since all 
articles for an entire year are studied, resulting in several hundred articles being 
reviewed. 
T 
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Die Welt is a German national daily newspaper published by the Axel Springer 
AG company. It was founded in Hamburg in 1946 by the British occupying 
forces, and was later on in 1953 acquired by the Axel Springer Empire. Today is 
Die Welt the flagship of the Axel Springer AG, which moreover take a centre-
right political position. The main editorial office is situated in Berlin and the 
circulation is about 244 200 in approximately 130 countries. Its leading 
competitors are the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, the Süddeutsche Zeitung and 
the Frankfurter Rundschau. 
 
Svenska Dagbladet (SvD) is a large daily national newspaper in Sweden. It was 
first published in 1884 and since 1998 is the Schiebsted Empire (Norway) the 
main owner of the newspaper. It’s published in Stockholm and covers national 
and international news. The circulation of Svenska Dagbladet is about 201 100 
and its main competitors are Dagens Nyheter and Göteborgs-Posten. The stated 
position of the editorial page is "independent conservative" (oberoende moderat), 
which means it is independent but adheres to the liberal conservatism of the 
Swedish Conservative Party. 
 
The choice of newspapers could naturally have been different, but after 
considering the equalities of the two newspapers, mentioned above, we found the 
choices optimal. A further advantage of this selection is the uncomplicated access 
to the archives. A disadvantage could possibly be the conservative and right-
political position of the newspapers, on the other hand is an advantage the fact 
that both newspapers enjoy the same direction.  Another possible choice of 
newspapers could have been Handelsblatt (Germany) and Dagens Industri 
(Sweden). We argue that the amount of articles would probably have been larger, 
as both newspapers have most focus on financial/business news. The more units 
included in the study, the more probable is a generalisation of an entire population 
(Jacobsen 2002). We hence argue that a generalisation would have been more 
reliable if the amount of articles was larger, e.g. due to the selection of the papers 
Handelsblatt and Dagens Industri, but that the result would have been the same 
(see section 3.2 and 3.7 for further discussions about the generalisation of our 
results).  
 
The time period studied has been delimitated to a one-year period, from the 1st of 
January 2005 until the 31st of December 2005. The motive is that articles, like all 
news, are perishables. It’s hence considered as highly desirable to examine 
articles of as recent date as possible in order to make the results of the thesis as 
interesting and adequate as possible. The year 2005 is thus found as the most 
reasonable time period to study. 
 
 
 
International Corporate Governance 
A Comparison of the Corporate Governance Systems in Germany and Sweden 
 
 
 39
3.2 Content Analysis 
 
A content analysis can be defined as “a research technique for the objective, 
systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” 
(Berelson in Krippendorff 1980). Content analysis can also, somewhat more 
specifically, be described as a method used when documents and texts are to be 
analysed. The method is very flexible and is excellent for different types of media 
analysis. The aim is to quantify the content of the texts studied, in this case 
newspaper articles, in a systematic and replicable way. Objectivity and systemic 
are key aspects when using the content analysis method. It is important to clearly 
define the categorisation of the raw material in an early stage of the study, in order 
to obtain objectivity. (Bryman & Bell 2005) Thus are the hypotheses defined, 
which are examined through the content analysis, before the search is started. The 
articles included in the study can therefore be categorised as soon as they are 
found.  
 
The objectivity is obtained as far as it’s possible through a well specified code 
manual and carefully selected keywords. The key words used by the searches 
have a clear link to the relevant hypothesis; thereby clearly indicating in which 
category the articles found belongs. It is however important to emphasise that the 
articles are categorised according to their content only and not according to the 
key words used by the search (a more detailed list of key words for each 
hypothesis and country is found in appendix B). 
 
The systemic of the study is another important aspect in order to limit the 
skewness and the faults of the study as much as possible. This is done by a 
consequent manner of work. (Bryman & Bell 2005) To obtain systemic, the 
categorisation of the articles is done consequently with assistance of a code 
manual (for further details see section 3.3.1. and appendix A). The design of the 
coding scheme is of great importance and is dependent of a clear formulation of 
the research question (Bryman & Bell 2005). The variables are thus explained in 
the code manual to achieve a coding scheme that is as complete and 
understandable as possible. 
 
Two other fundamental concepts of the content analysis are quantity and manifest 
(Berelson in Krippendorff 1980) Quantity means that the variables are supposed 
to be expressed as frequency or volume, to make it possible to define statistical 
relations. Manifest content imply that the analysis is limited to what can clearly be 
described by the text. (Ekström & Larsson 2000) Instructions with purpose of 
usage of the variables will therefore be included in the code manual (see appendix 
A for more details).         
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Furthermore, it’s relatively easy to describe how the data was chosen and 
construct a code scheme, which makes a replication of the study simple. (Bryman 
& Bell 2005) The method is also favourable when a larger amount of data is to be 
analysed (Ekström & Larsson 2000), which is the case of this study.  
 
The ability to generalise the results from the content analysis is according to 
Ekström and Larsson (2000) high when the study is systematically constructed 
and formalised. They moreover argue that a well constructed content analysis 
enables a comparison between different media sources. The purpose of a content 
analysis is to reveal the individual unit, aiming to generalise it (Ekström & 
Larsson 2000). Through the study process we aim to avoid exercising individual 
prejudices and opinions on the variables that are included in the research. As the 
study is conducted with a formalised code scheme and specified instructions, 
initiated in the code manual, is the generalisation level for the chosen time period 
considered as high.   
 
 
3.3 Coding 
 
The coding is a very important and central part of the content analysis. An 
obvious starting point is the examination of available literature of how data are 
related to their context (Krippendorff 1980). The variables, used in the code 
manual, were constructed after studying a larger amount of literature on the 
subject corporate governance with emphasis on the four chosen aspects. The 
variables are our tools when conduction the analysis and so forth is each variable 
coded with a number (see appendix A).  
 
A variable is a symbol which stands for any one of a set of two or more mutually 
exclusive values such as objects, categories and qualities (Krippendorff 1980). For 
each hypothesis have 6-10 variables been used. The three first variables for each 
hypothesis are identical, but remaining variables are somewhat specific for each 
aspect. They are however still similar in order to receive results for the different 
hypothesis that are comparable. 
 
The accomplished pilot tests and the consultation with three objective persons, 
who reviewed the code manual, led to some vital modifications of the variables in 
the manual. The changes were conducted to increase the objectivity, quality and 
comparability of the study.   
 
It’s important in our study to clearly keep the four different hypotheses separate. 
When dealing with an article that debates two of our hypotheses will the article be 
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coded and analysed twice24. Moreover, articles are only analysed when the 
hypothesis is centrally debated, i.e. articles where the issue is a sub-subject or 
briefly mentioned are not considered. As the heading and introduction didn’t 
always reveal the core content of the debate, are the articles entirely read through, 
in the majority of the cases, before deciding whether the article should be included 
in the study or not.  
 
 
3.3.1 Code Manual 
 
Article Size 
The first variable (I, XI, XVII, XXIII) called “article size” (see appendix A) was 
chosen in order to make it possible to judge how much interest the aspect were 
given by the newspapers. The article size is argued to be a measure of the public 
interest in the aspect. An aspect considered by the newspapers to be of large 
interest to the public is in our opinion also given a large space in the paper. The 
articles’ placement in the paper is however also a measure of its interest and thus 
an alternative way to measure. An article at the first pages is for instance of higher 
interest than articles further back in the paper and so on. As we have used the 
electronic versions of the articles due to the better access of old articles, it’s 
however not possible to decide their placement in the paper. Consequentially, the 
size is measured in the amount of words, and not the placement of the articles. 
Another argument for measuring the interest in this way is that it’s reliable since it 
isn’t subject for any subjective decisions, but evident facts. The article size is, 
based on the results from the pilot study, divided into three groups; “small” (0-150 
words), “middle” (151-500 words) and “large” (501 words or more).  
 
Who/What has caused the Newspaper to write an Article on the Issue? 
The second variable (II, XII, XVIII, and XXIV) measures what has caused the 
newspaper to write an article on the aspect. Our reason for including this variable 
is that we want to know what has originally caused the papers to write the articles 
we find, since this can help explaining the reason for the topic debated. The 
coding is conducted by using five alternatives were the first four are the origins 
implied to be the most common, based on the results of the pilot tests. These are 
“politic”, “industry”, “media”, and “public”. To prevent incorrect coding, due to a 
lack of appropriate coding alternatives, an fifth alternative called “unknown” is 
included.  
 
The alternative “politic” is coded when the issue in the hypothesis was originally 
caused by a political statement, e.g. a politician discussing or establishing a new 
                                                           
24 See Halici & Kucukaslan (2005) 
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law. Consequently, a political source caused the debate to develop, and politic is 
then the source referred to in the article. The second coding alternative is the 
“industry”, which was coded when a person from the industry or a corporation 
e.g. had published documents on the issue or brought up the issue due to its 
occurrence in the corporation. The third variable “media” was coded when the 
newspaper or another media source on its own initiative had brought up the issue 
for discussion, in these cases wasn’t a direct action made by politicians or 
individuals in the industry the main cause for the debate. The media started an 
investigation and debate on the issue while the media considered it essential to 
inform the readers. An interview with one or several persons keeping focus on the 
issue is one example when the “media” alternative was chosen. The fourth 
alternative “public” was coded when an action made by a common person had 
caused the debated issue to take place. When coding this variable, subjective 
interpretation is impossible to completely exclude, for that reason were the coding 
alternatives specified above as well as in the code manual (appendix A). In the 
few situations the origin of the debate was unclear; the content of the article was 
discussed before coding.  
 
Support for… 
The third and last variable identical for all four aspects (III, XIII, XIX, and XXV) 
is measuring whether the article supports the aspect or not. The aim with this 
variable is to reflect what attitude the newspapers have towards the different 
owners. Since the newspapers debates issues relevant in their respective society 
and mould the public opinion, we find it probable that their attitudes are about the 
same as the attitudes of the society as a whole. Other ways to get hold of the 
equivalent information were not considered possible with the chosen method, but 
would have had required other methods, e.g. questionnaires. The support of the 
aspects is here defined as explicit and implicit statements made in the articles. As 
implicit statements are included, a certain degree of subjectivity in the coding of 
this variable is impossible to exclude completely (see section 3.7). An exclusion 
of implicit statements had however led to a misleading result since criticism 
seldom is expressed in a direct way, but in subtle ways. Four alternatives are used 
to code this variable: “negative attitude”, “neutral/none”, “positive attitude” and 
“both positive and negative attitude”. These alternatives were chosen as they were 
seen as the possible ones, but the choice was also based on the outcome of the 
pilot tests. 
 
The Role of… 
The variables IV to IX are formulated as yes or no questions and are specific for 
the first aspect: ownership structure. The aim with these questions is to reveal 
which types of owners that are discussed in the articles in order to reveal which 
ownership types is the most important today. Ownership types frequently 
discussed or presented in the newspapers are supposed to be more important than 
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the ones less frequently debated since the articles are written due to changes in the 
ownership structure. Articles discussing several ownership groups are coded for 
all the relevant groups simultaneously. The alternatives are based on the literature 
review in chapter 2, and the most essential owners in the two systems were 
selected. The following alternatives are: banks and financial institutions, non-
financial companies, families and private owners, interest spheres, foreign 
investors, and finally the public sector.  
 
In What Way is…changing/debated? 
The variables X and XIV measures primarily if the aspects are changing, and in 
the case of a yes answer it’s measured how. The variables XX and XXVI, on the 
other hand, measures what focus the debates have. The reason for including these 
variables was to reveal if and how the aspects are developing and adjusting to new 
conditions in the society. This information could probably have been collected in 
other ways, e.g. by using multiple variables. This would however imply extensive 
extra work, while the possibilities to collect comprehensive additional information 
are considered being limited and less important. We therefore decided to 
formulate a single general variable to keep it as simple as possible in order to 
receive as reliable results as possible. An extensive code manual is exhausting 
when coding since each article consists of large amounts of information, relevant 
and irrelevant, making it hard to keep the head clear when coding and avoiding 
incorrect coding. Five coding alternatives are given, were the first four are; 
“decreasing”, “maintain”, “increasing” and “both decreasing and increasing” 
which were considered as the most probable alternatives. Just like for the variable 
measuring what caused the article is a fifth alternative called “unknown” included 
to prevent incorrect coding. 
 
The positive/negative effects of … experienced by the company. 
The two variables measuring the effects of the aspect experienced by the 
companies are formulated as yes or no questions and included for all aspects but 
the ownership structure. The reason for the exclusion of the ownership aspect was 
that it’s comprehensive, or even impossible, to determine what effects it has on 
the companies. Furthermore, the probability for this topic being discussed was 
considered as small. The aim with these two variables is to reveal whether the 
attitudes revealed by the support-variable are based on deeper facts or not.  
 
 
3.3.2 Coding in Practice 
 
The articles will be coded in Excel according to the code manual, and the titles of 
the articles and dates of publication will be registered, organised after publication 
date. This will make it easier to take in. When different keywords present the 
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same article they can easily be detected. Before running the data in SPSS were the 
articles and the coding reviewed and checked once more to avoid incorrect coding 
and/or the inclusion of irrelevant articles in the study. After the second review 
were a few mistakes found and adjusted. 
 
Table 1: Example of a code scheme taken from the hypothesis 2: Employee representation on the 
boards 
 
When coding the ownership, employee and compensation hypotheses were only 
articles considered that had a clear relationship to Germany/Sweden and the 
situation in/for German/Swedish corporations. This resulted in 130 articles (50 for 
Germany and 80 for Sweden) for the ownership hypothesis, 48 articles (47 for 
Germany and 1 for Sweden) for the employee hypothesis and another 67 articles 
for the compensation hypothesis (33 for Germany and 34 for Sweden). 
Considering the hypothesis of female directors on boards were articles with clear 
relation to the chosen country considered as well as articles where the issue was 
debated in other countries. This choice has been made while the examples debated 
in the articles are often seen as role models and can be considered as a foundation 
for a continuing debate in the chosen countries. The search for articles relevant to 
the hypothesis concerning female directors hence resulted in 58 articles (18 for 
Germany and 40 for Sweden). 
 
 
3.4 Significant Tests 
 
Two types of significant test are conducted in order to test the significance of the 
observed differences in and between the two countries. As a relative small amount 
of articles was found in the article search, the choice of significant tests is crucial. 
The chi-square test is used when the differences in each country are investigated 
and a t-test is used when the two countries were compared with each other. Only 
variable alternatives relevant to study were tested and ranked according to size 
and power level. E.g. were the alternatives “both”, “other” and “unknown” in the 
related variable excluded due to its lack of relevance for the significant tests. 
Consequently, the significant tests of the variables contain diverging amounts of 
articles which is specified in appendix C-F.  
   Variable: 
 
Article:  
XI: 
Article 
size 
XII: Origin 
of the debate 
XIII: 
Support 
XIV: Changing 
Power 
XV:Negative 
effects 
XVI:Positive 
effects 
1 3 3 2 1 1 2 
2 2 2 1 4 2 1 
3 3 1 1 5 1 1 
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3.4.1 Chi-Square ( 2χ ) Test 
 
The chi-square method is a nonparametric test used for smaller samples in order 
to determine if an observed difference can be guaranteed to be statistically 
significant. The probability for differences to exist will be observed when the 
frequencies differ in a larger extent from the expected. It’s however first when the 
result of the chi-square test is below 5 % (significance level), that the results is 
significantly guaranteed. (Wahlgren 2005) 
 
The chi-square tests conducted in this research are performed in SPSS and the 
results presented in appendix C-F. The tests are conducted for each country and 
variable separately in order to establish where the significant differences occur. 
All hypotheses, except hypothesis 2 for Sweden, and all variables except the 
variable “in what way is….debated?” in hypothesis 3 for both countries, were 
examined.  The hypothesis 2 for Sweden couldn’t be examined as only one single 
article was found. The variable “in what way is….debated?” in hypothesis 3 
couldn’t be examined as none of the German articles solely debated the 
compensation level and none of the Swedish articles debated the legislation topic 
exclusively. As these variable alternatives were the only relevant to test, these 
tests couldn’t be completed. Nevertheless, the results were evident enough, which 
is also discussed in chapter 4.   
 
 
3.4.2 T-test 
 
The purpose of the t-test is to analyse the significant difference between Germany 
and Sweden in relation to the research variables. Consequently, the conclusion if 
significant differences exist between the two countries concerning the researched 
variables can be drawn when the test present a significance level of 5 % or less. 
(Wahlgren 2005) 
 
The t-test conducted for the two countries collectively is an independent – 
samples t-test in SPSS, aiming to perform a hypothesis test of the means of two 
independent groups (Germany & Sweden).  All data was put together and 
specified for the two countries, and consequently grouped before conducting the 
test. All hypotheses except hypothesis 2, and all variables except the variables 
“the role of… owners” in hypothesis 1 and the variable “in what way 
is….debated?” in hypothesis 3, were examined.  The reasoning for hypotheses 2 
and 3 is equivalent with the one discussed above (see Chi-Square test). The 
variable “the role of…owners” in hypothesis 1 couldn’t be conducted with a t-test 
as the variable contains several alternatives (e.g. banks, interest spheres, foreign 
investors etc.) which couldn’t be ranked according to size and power influence. 
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As the t-test is comparing means of the two countries, the result of a t-test for this 
variable would be deceptive and therefore not included. The results of the t-tests 
are presented in appendix C-F in relation to each variable.  
 
 
3.5 Course of Action 
 
Step 1 The German and Swedish corporate governance systems are studied 
theoretically and compared with each other. Additionally, other 
studies conducted at the German and/or Swedish market are studied. 
The findings are presented in chapter 2.  
 
Step 2 Hypotheses based on the theoretical foundation and the 
characteristics of the German and Swedish corporate governance 
systems are formulated. 
 
Step 3 The variables are defined and explained, and a code manual and 
scheme is constructed. 
 
Step 4 The archive of the newspaper die Welt and the database Affärsdata 
(Business data) are searched for articles in die Welt and Svenska 
Dagbladet considering the issues debated in the hypotheses. The 
search has been limited to the one-year period 2005. Key words for 
each hypothesis were used to find the accurate articles. Articles of 
interest and accuracy to the study are listed in inverted chronological 
order in Microsoft Word. 
 
Step 5 Four pilot tests are completed, one for each hypothesis, and the code 
manual modified. 
 
Step 6 Coding the data and conducting the real study, registering articles 
and coding systematically in Excel 
 
Step 7 Sort and register in Excel and SPSS, where the chi-square method 
and t-tests are used. 
 
 
3.6 Reliability 
 
We have chosen to conduct a content analysis, which means that the results of this 
study will be highly dependent on the code manual that we design. It’s therefore 
very important how the code manual is designed, and according to Jacobsen 
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(2002) is it very important to make the questions concrete. As a consequence of 
this, are the selection and formulation of the variables included in the study 
conducted with great carefulness.  
 
After formulating the variables in the code manual, a critical review of included 
variables and their formulation was done in order to assure that the collected data 
would be the wanted. Furthermore, to obtain highest possible level of objectivity, 
three independent persons (see section 3.1) have reviewed the code manual and 
given feed-back. To let colleagues or other initiated persons control the 
reasonability of the concretisation of a subject is a common way of assuring the 
validity according to Jacobsen (2002). 
 
Based on the received feed-back, some changes were done, where after a pilot test 
was conducted. The results of the pilot test caused some further modifications of 
the formulation of the variables before the actual study was accomplished. The 
study is conducted electronically, using computerised search devices, which 
means that key words are to be used in order to find the articles wanted. The result 
of the study is hence dependent of the choice of key words. The chosen key words 
are therefore controlled by two independent persons having German respectively 
Swedish as mother tongue. The two independent persons were students but they 
don’t study business administration or economics. The key words they thought 
should be included were applied and the result of these searches included in the 
study. 
 
Furthermore, the code manual is constructed in a way to minimise 
misinterpretations and help avoiding multiple choice answers. Ekström and 
Larsson (2000) point out two important rules concerning the variable values. They 
should be complete and comprehensive in association to the research problem and 
mutually exclusive, i.e. it shouldn’t be possible to code the same analyse unit in 
more than one way (Ekström & Larsson 2000). Although the code manual aims to 
describe the variables and code rules comprehensively, is a complete exclusion of 
incorrect coding and smaller errors not possible, which is one of the disadvantages 
with this method. 
 
The coding of the articles is a critical moment as the interpretation of the coding 
manual is associated with the risk that it might be performed in a subjective way. 
That there often are elements that leave some space for interpretation when doing 
a content analysis in practice is argued to be the most important disadvantage of 
the method by Ekström and Larsson (2000). Bryman and Bell (2005) argue that 
it’s impossible to construct a code manual without an amount of interpretation 
from the coders’ side, due to cultural background. Consequently, a detailed code 
manual (appendix A) and description of the variables (section 3.3.1) were 
conducted. 
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Except the above described actions made to counter-check the disadvantages of 
the method is the internal validity also controlled through a comparison of our 
results with the results of earlier research, presented in chapter 2. To compare the 
results of a study with theory and the results of other studies is a very common 
way to validate a study’s results (Jacobsen 2002). 
 
As the content analysis is based upon secondary data, the reliability of the data 
used in the content analysis limits the reliability of the method, which can’t be 
higher than the reliability of the sources used. (Bryman & Bell 2005) The choice 
of data sources is thus of importance and is conducted with care with clearly 
descriptions. As the newspapers constituting the basis for the study were to be 
chosen, their reliability was taken into account and only newspapers regarded as 
highly reliable, qualitative and convenient were considered. 
 
Despite the presented drawbacks of the method, is the content analysis regarded 
as the method best suited for the kind of study conducted here and is thus the 
method used. The advantages of the method are used to compensate for the 
drawbacks. The presentation of the course of action in part 3.4 enables 
replications and is one way to do so.   
 
 
3.7 Validity 
 
The validity measures if it’s possible to generalise the results of a study to larger 
populations and which accuracy such generalisations have (Krippendorff 1980; 
Jacobsen 2002). Jacobsen (2002) states that a quantitative method is well suited 
for generalisations from stick tests studied of a larger sample that hasn’t been 
studied, which is the purpose of this study. In order to be able to generalise the 
results of the study, based on a few newspaper articles, to the whole German and 
Swedish society, we have used a two step cluster selection. In the first step is the 
clusters selected, i.e. the two newspapers, and in the second step are the research 
units selected, i.e. the articles relevant to the study (see section 3.3 for further 
details) (Dahmström 1996). The reliability of the results of the coded articles is 
then tested with the chi-square method to guarantee the validity of the conclusions 
drawn. 
 
This study contains of approximately 35-80 articles per hypothesis and country, 
with exception of the German articles for hypothesis 4 (18) and the Swedish for 
hypothesis 2 (1). Consequently, the validity of the conclusions drawn based upon 
the results of this study can be statistically guaranteed with the exception of 
hypothesis 2 for Sweden. To execute a chi-square test for the hypothesis 2 
regarding Sweden is however not possible due to the absence of Swedish articles. 
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It’s highly important to remember that a generalisation is limited in time and 
space, i.e. the results of a study can never be generalised to other time periods 
than the one chosen or to other populations than the one from which the random 
samples has been taken (Jacobsen 2002). It’s hence not possible for us to 
generalise our results to other time periods than the year 2005 or other countries 
than Germany and Sweden. In our conclusion will we therefore generalise our 
results to Germany and Sweden during 2005, but no other countries or time 
periods. 
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4 Results and Analysis 
 
 
In this chapter, the results from the study will be presented and analysed in order 
to answer the four hypotheses and fulfil the purpose of the thesis. The chapter 
concludes with a summary of the results.  
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
efore presenting and analysing the results of the content analysis, we want to 
make the reader aware of factors that could have, and most probably even 
have had, an impact on our results. Factors influencing the results are impossible 
to eliminate, and shouldn’t be. This study is a study of the present state and the 
factors that influence the results could be influencing the overall future 
development of the topic. As the relevance of these factors is unknown at the 
moment, they should be kept in mind through the reasoning below, but not be 
emphasised. 
 
The results concerning Germany might have been influenced by the fact that the 
year 2005 was election year. Consequently, the politicians were more active and 
the debates more intense than usual. This has more or less been noticed for all 
hypotheses, but with less emphasis on the aspect of ownership structure. We 
consider this factor as being less influential on the existence/non-existence of 
debates and issues discussed, even if it has enlarged the amount of articles. The 
amount of articles originating from the politics is very likely to have been 
enlarged as well. 
 
As opposed to the German results, the results concerning Sweden haven’t been 
influenced by any general factor such as elections etc. The Skandia scandal has 
however been a dominant issue in Sweden, which most probably have influenced 
the amount of articles found on the compensation issue. However, since the 
results for this aspect are unequivocal, we find it less likely that the overall result 
depends on this factor. Another factor that has influenced our result is that the 
time period, assigned for the companies to voluntarily reach a ratio of 25 % of 
female board members, expired by the end of 2004. As the companies failed to 
reach this ratio, the possible consequences of this fact were discussed by the 
media, causing the amount of articles found for this aspect to be larger than for a 
“normal” year. This factor has characterised the debate on this issue and thus 
influenced our results. We are however considering this fact as a consequence of 
B 
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the debate’s development and thus argue that it isn’t an isolated action, but a 
process in the development. 
 
 
4.2 Ownership Structure 
 
As corporate governance originates from the separation of ownership and control 
that took place in the 19th century, the aspect of ownership structure has been of 
central importance ever since. Yet, this does not imply that the ownership 
structure hasn’t changed during the last two centuries. On the contrary, the 
development of the society as a whole has forced the corporations and their 
owners to change as well. During the most recent decades, the globalisation of the 
market has shaped the ownership structures of firms. Another aspect of recent 
date is the privatisation of firms, former owned by the public sector, aiming to 
enhance the efficiency of the corporations. This implies that the corporations are 
transformed to listed companies, owned by the public. An increasing public 
interest in owning shares has been developing simultaneous with the other aspects 
mentioned. This has resulted in an enhanced demand for information over 
industry events, which has caused the media to debate and report on such events.  
 
As discussed in chapter 2, the ownership structure in Germany and Sweden is 
characterised by concentrated ownership (insider system). Institutional investors 
are dominating both markets, but the major institutional owners are somewhat 
different in the two systems. Banks normally have an important role in the 
German companies and their central role has resulted in long and close 
relationships between the banks and the listed companies (e.g. Almond et al. 
2003; Hackethal et al. 2005). The banks’ role as owners is moreover argued to be 
changing in the German corporate governance system (Monks & Minow 2001; 
Jackson & Moerke 2005). In Sweden, on the other hand, are the major owners; 
families, interest spheres and foreign investors which posses A-shares. The major 
owners’ ability to control firms while not contributing as much financially has 
made the Swedish dual-class share system unpopular among foreign investors. 
They are not especially familiar with it, seldom get the opportunity to buy A-
shares, and thus argue for a change in the ownership structure. We formulated our 
first hypothesis based on these facts. As the hypothesis constitutes the basis of our 
research, it’s presented below in order to remind the reader of the research basis. 
 
Hypothesis 1 a): The role of major owners is changing. 
Consequently, the role of banks and financial 
institutions as owners will be emphasised in 
the debate in German media. 
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Hypothesis 1 b): The role of major owners is changing. 
Consequently, the role of interest spheres and 
families will be emphasised in the debate in 
Swedish media. 
 
The search for articles dealing with major owners and their role in the companies 
resulted in 50 articles being relevant to the hypothesis for Germany and another 
80 articles for Sweden. The German articles were found to be significantly larger 
than the Swedish, although the Swedish articles were notably often of middle size 
(see appendix C). We are thus presuming that media in both countries often write 
articles were the ownership structure is presented comprehensively and in its 
context. That German articles are significantly larger, can be interpreted as a 
consequence of the complex ownership structures caused by the frequent 
occurrence of cross-holdings in Germany.  
 
 Germany           Sweden 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Origin of the debated issues in Germany and Sweden.  
 
According to the results of our study, the industry itself was significantly the most 
common starting point of the issues debated in both countries (see Figure 1 above 
and appendix C). We are interpreting this as the media being reporting industrial 
events such as M&A’s and corporate scandals, causing ownership restructurings. 
It should also be noted that the amount of articles caused by political 
statements/actions and articles initiated by media are significantly few in both 
countries, although 14 % of the German articles were caused by either of these 
two originators.  
 
The articles have a neutral approach to the major owners in both countries, but the 
German articles are more often presenting a positive or negative attitude than the 
Swedish. We argue that this implies that the German newspaper is more debating 
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than the Swedish, which could be due to dissatisfaction with the present legal 
framework of the ownership structure in Germany. The Swedish articles are 
neutral significantly often, which we interpret as a lack of an active debate in 
Sweden, since they lack augmenting structure. This implies that the articles 
review events on the stock market in an objective way, which could explain the 
fact that the industry is the major cause of the articles.  
 
  Germany       Sweden 
20,3%
12,78%
24,06%
15,04%
18,8%
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Non-financial 
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Figure 2: The major owners being debated in German and Swedish newspapers. 
 
The results of our study of the newspapers’ interest in reporting on different types 
of ownership are presented in figure 2 above. Almond et al. (2003) states that 
banks are more often powerful owners in Germany than in Sweden, which our 
results support. The banks’ power to control German corporations through proxy 
votes is a possible explanation for the large media interest. This is supported by 
the fact that Swedish banks don’t possess proxy votes and only debated half as 
often as the German banks. The extent in which Swedish banks are powerful 
owners shouldn’t be underestimated though. Their power is however related 
closely with interest spheres and families. 
 
Non-financial owners receive about equally much interest from media in the two 
countries. The fact that this is the third most debated ownership type in both 
countries could be explained by M&A-activities. Numerous of listed companies in 
the two countries are major owners in other corporations. We find it natural that 
these ownerships are extended in course of time, resulting in M&A’s reported in 
the papers. 
 
Families and interest spheres are not so common in Germany as in Sweden. This 
is also the most probable explanation for the German media’s low interest in these 
ownership types. They are the least debated ownership types in Germany. The 
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Swedish counterparts are also among the ownership groups receiving least 
interest, but are debated more than the German (13 % vs. 7 % and 15 % vs. 0 % 
respectively). This result is, according to us, a consequence of the large power 
they possess due to the dual-class system in Sweden and their relations to the 
Swedish banks. 
 
Foreign investors are the most debated ownership type in Sweden, debated almost 
double as often as the German counterpart. We are interpreting this as the foreign 
investors being more active on the Swedish market and thus receiving more 
interest from the media. The co-determination applied in Germany would in that 
case explain this result. According to Ashauer (1999), the co-determination is a 
possible hindrance in the international competition. We are hence of the opinion 
that the prominent co-determination is the most probable reason for the, compared 
to Sweden, low interest in foreign investors in Germany (13 % compared to 24 % 
in Sweden).  
 
The public sector is debated almost double as much in Germany as in Sweden, 
implying that the German public sector is more active than the Swedish. A 
probable cause of the large interest in the German public sector could be 
privatisations of companies, former owned by the public sector. The low interest 
in the Swedish public sector could, according to us, be explained by the Swedish 
public sector being generally less active than the German, during 2005. 
 
There are significant differences between the two countries when it comes to in 
what way the role of major owners is changing. The German articles stated that 
the role of major owners is decreasing significantly (see appendix C). As we 
found the role of the banks and financial institutes to be the most frequently 
debated, we argue that it’s primarily their role that’s decreasing. It’s although 
difficult to fully imply that the results are truly revealing an overall significant 
situation of decreasing power of the German banks. Nevertheless, there is a debate 
taking place in the German newspaper about the decreasing power of major 
owners, which we argue is the essential part of the results found.  
 
The result of the study of the Swedish articles is however the contrary; in a 
significant amount of the articles is the role of the major owners said to be 
increasing. As foreign investors were found to be the most debated ownership 
type, we find it probable that it’s their power that increases. It’s however difficult 
to point out which ownership type that increases its power as no particular type is 
dominating the debate totally. What can be stated from our results is instead that a 
debate regarding changes is taking place in both countries, and that the way that 
the role of major owners is stated to change, differs significantly.  
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Finally, the bottom line is that hypothesis 1a can be accepted but that hypothesis 
1b must be rejected. Banks and financial institutions are the most debated owners 
in Germany, but the interest spheres and families were not the most debated types 
of owners in Sweden. The most debated ownership type was instead found to be 
foreign investors. 
 
 
4.3 Employee Representation on the Boards 
 
The representation of employees on boards is an essential element of the corporate 
governance applied in Germany as well as in Sweden. An important point in this 
aspect is the legal difference between the studied countries, which was brought 
forward in the literature review and research hypothesis in chapter 2. 
Nevertheless, the central difference is that the German companies according to the 
co-determination law are obliged to apply co-determination while the Swedish 
law is expressed as a right and not an obligation to have representatives on the 
board.   
 
A natural question is however, why is co-determination important, and are the 
advantages of exercising the right truly much larger than the disadvantages? 
Lewis et al. (2004) point out that having co-determination involves certain 
advantages; for example can better decision be made as employees’ poses 
information that management lack off, it’s more probable that people will 
implement decisions that they have decided about themselves, creativity, loyalty 
and respect might increase, better communication between management and 
employees can be established etc. Having a co-determination law can moreover 
help the decreasing of the agency-principal problematic while the employees get a 
possibility to monitor the top-executives, which was a central argument of 
McDonnell (in Mintz 2005). The relationship between the corporation and its 
managers and employees is consequently being favoured.  
 
It can additionally be discussed and questioned if the employees should have the 
possibility to get involved in governance and decision-making of the corporation. 
The strong co-determination in Germany has for instance experienced a great deal 
of criticism, which will be taken into account in the analysis of the results. As the 
corporation is surrounded by stakeholders that all have an interest on the 
corporation’s strategy development and decision-making, it can be discussed who 
truly is supposed to take seats on the boards and control the corporations. The 
second hypothesis will once more be presented below before taking a closer look 
on the results of the study: 
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Hypothesis 2: Co-determination will be debated in German media 
       more frequently than in Swedish. 
 
The results from the study are interesting for the reason that 47 articles were 
found in the German newspaper while only one article was found in the Swedish 
newspaper. The absence of Swedish articles has made statistical tests for Sweden 
impossible. Consequently, the significance tests were performed exclusively for 
the German articles. It might seem quite surprising that only one single article was 
found in the Swedish newspaper, although several different key words were used 
and the articles found were carefully investigated. In our opinion, these results are 
stressing the fact that the co-determination evidently is a more essential and 
debated issue in Germany than in Sweden. As the results from the study revealed 
a dominant outcome of articles from the German newspaper, the analysis and 
discussions presented will focus mainly on Germany. 
 
The articles found for this aspect are significantly of middle or large size (see 
appendix D), which makes it clear that the debate is not shallowly held. 
According to us, the fact that the subject is permitted to take up much space in the 
newspaper imply that the subject is well established and central in the German 
debate. 
 
Germany 
23,4%
23,4%
48,94%
4,26%
Media
Industry
Politic
Unknown
 
Figure 3: Origin of the debated issues in Germany (Sweden is excluded since only one relevant 
article was found). 
 
Media is significantly the most common origin of the debate, but many articles 
originate from the politics and the industry as well. We argue that this implies that 
co-determination is an issue that concerns most parties in the German society. The 
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industry is a source of the debate being of natural importance, since it’s in the 
corporations where the co-determination is practiced and the problems occur. Due 
to the debate from the side of the industry and the subject’s relevance for the 
German people, the topic ought to have had an important role in the political 
debate in association with the election in 2005. Altogether, this could explain why 
media is the most common origin of the debate. Furthermore, we argue that media 
found the issue essential since it was a burning question. An additional reason for 
the media to write articles on the issue could be that even if co-determination is 
relevant to most employees, it’s not everybody that understand which 
consequences it has for the different parties in the German society.  
 
Despite the existing advantages of co-determination, our results reveal that the 
attitude towards co-determination in Germany was significantly negative, i.e. fully 
45 % of the articles had a negative attitude. This result points out that the criticism 
of the valid Co-determination Act is prominent and we are stressing that the 
criticism is caused by the dissatisfaction of persons and/or corporations who are 
affected by its legal constraints.  
 
Furthermore, the significantly most common opinion regarding the way the co-
determination is changing, was that its power is or wished to be decreasing. This 
combined with the criticism found, we interpret as a desire to change the present 
Co-determination Act and let it be less strict in the future. We therefore argue that 
the advantages mentioned above don’t fully overcome the disadvantages 
empirically observed. A possible reason could, according to Ashauer (1999), be 
that the co-determination is a hindrance that limits the competitive advantages of 
German corporations in the present environment of intense global competition.  
 
This is supported further by the fact that a significant amount of the articles stated 
the co-determination having negative effects on the companies (see appendix D). 
According to us, the negative effects could be a result of the co-determination’s 
possible disadvantages in the global competition. The essential components of 
successful global competitive advantages like speed and flexibility thus have to 
get improved and strengthened. 
 
As a debate of co-determination is non-existent in Sweden, we interpret the 
situation in Sweden as the public, corporations; trade unions etc. being satisfied 
with how the present co-determination works in Swedish corporations. The single 
article presented in the Swedish newspaper showed a positive attitude on the issue 
and argued for increasing power. This is in line with the results of a study 
conducted by Levinson (2001). He argues that the co-operation between the 
employee representatives and the top executives in Sweden is characterised by 
mutual benefits. 
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We argue that a vital reason for the differences in the two countries is the fact that 
the business cultures are diverging. The German corporate structure is rather 
strongly hierarchical while the Swedish is more decentralised. The more 
decentralised working situation in the Swedish corporations facilitates the 
communication and relationship between the employees and directors, enabling 
fast decisions, and consequently a strong co-determination is less needed and 
desired.  
 
The bottom line is that hypothesis 2 can be accepted, due to the evident amount of 
articles found in the German media.  
 
 
4.4 Disclosure of Board Members’ Compensation 
 
This aspect is debated frequently in both countries. As transparency and 
disclosure of information lies at the core of corporate governance are the results 
from the two studied countries interesting in a comparison.  
 
Corporate governance involves, as described by OECD, a set of relationships 
between the corporation’s management, its board(s), shareholders and 
stakeholders. They all have an interest in the transparency of the company’s 
information and disclosure of the board members’ salaries and bonus systems. 
Through disclosure of the board members’ compensations, the shareholders obtain 
a clearer view of the corporate governance implemented by the company. It also 
provides a clearer explanation of whether the performance and income of the top 
executives are consistent with each other or not. Additionally, the shareholder can 
judge if the current dividend level is justified.  
 
Consequently, the German and Swedish laws of disclosing compensation are 
aiming to increase the shareholder’s control rights and protect the shareholder by 
distributing as much information as possible and hence aim to minimise the 
principal-agent problematic and the transaction costs. The shareholder wants to be 
sure that the top executives work in the best interest of the company though the 
shareholders control of the company often is limited (due to the separation of 
ownership and control). The German companies weren’t obliged to share this kind 
of information with the shareholders until 2006, but a new law was then 
established. In Sweden on the other hand, the public access to official records was 
established already in 1766. The Swedish shareholders are thus used to be able to 
get hold of this kind of information, which has led us to formulate our third 
hypothesis as follows: 
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Hypothesis 3a): The disclosure of individual compensations of 
board members will be debated in the German 
media due to the new law and the origin of the 
debate will therefore be political. 
 
Hypothesis 3b): In Sweden, the compensation levels will be debated 
as legal constraints already exist. Consequently, the 
origin of the Swedish debate will be rooted in media 
and the industry. 
 
In the German newspaper, we found 33 articles of relevance and another 34 
relevant articles were found in the Swedish newspaper. Articles of middle size 
dominated significantly in both countries and no significant differences exist 
between the article size in the German newspaper and the Swedish (see appendix 
E). This stresses that the debate concerning the aspect was given about equally 
large scope and debated equally frequent in the two countries. In our opinion, this 
implies that the aspect is vital in the corporate governance debate in Germany as 
well as in Sweden. 
 
There are though some differences concerning the topics debated in each country 
and the source which has caused the debates’ occurrence. As discussed in the 
literature review and research hypotheses, there are some crucial differences 
between the two countries. In particular is the legal aspect of the disclosure of 
board members’ compensation and the attitudes towards such actions diverging 
significantly (see appendix E).  
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Figure 4: Origin of the debate on the compensation issue. 
 
The German debate was dominated significantly by articles rooted in the politic 
(see figure 4 above and appendix E). We argue that the intensive legislation 
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debate held by politicians during 2005 caused this result. It was namely first 
during the last year (2005) that German politicians decided to put the individual 
disclosure of board members’ compensations into law. As a consequence, it will 
be applied first in this year (2006) and observed earliest in the spring 2007, when 
the annual reports of the fiscal year 2006 will be distributed. As the legislation 
affects the industry, a large amount of articles were rooted in the industry as well. 
 
The origins of the debate in Sweden differ significantly from the debate origins in 
Germany. A significant amount of the Swedish articles were rooted in the 
industry. We argue that this is due to the custom to disclose the compensations of 
board members in Sweden. The debate is therefore not found primarily among 
political debates and political law proposals, but in the industry.  
 
Significantly few German articles were neutral, indicating that the disclosure of 
board members’ compensation is a highly debated issue in Germany. We find it 
natural to interpret this as a discussion about the new law being established. It’s 
probably controversial since it’s against the German custom to disclose this kind 
of information. As the positive attitude is nine percentage units larger than the 
negative, and articles of political origin are more common than articles originating 
from the industry, our opinion is that the politicians argue for the disclosure and 
the industry against. Furthermore, this would be in line with the results of the 
studies conducted by Peck & Ruigrok (2000) and v. Werder et al. (2005). They 
found that the majority of the German chairmen are against disclosure of 
management compensations despite that they have accepted the new corporate 
governance code. It will therefore be highly interesting to witness the 
establishment of the new German law to follow its consequences. Will all German 
companies obey the law or will the largest companies with the biggest opponents 
try to avoid it? 
 
This problematic differs from the situation in Sweden, where the articles were 
significantly neutral. We interpret this as the Swedish society having no larger 
problems with this issue and hold the existence of the right of public access to 
official records as the most probable reason for this. 
 
Based on these results, it can be stated that the disclosure of board members’ 
compensation was discussed in significantly different ways in the two countries. 
In Germany, the debate was always conducted in association with the legislative 
actions while the compensation levels were reported and sometimes criticised in 
Sweden (for further details, see appendix E). 
 
As it comes to the experienced effects of the disclosure of board members’ 
compensation, there is no difference between the two countries. Yet, the effects 
(both positive and negative) are discussed by the German newspaper in a larger 
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extent than by the Swedish. We find this a natural consequence of the cultural 
difference; Germany now starts to disclose this kind of information while it has 
been done since 1766 in Sweden.  
 
The results from our study confirm that the disclosure of board members’ 
compensation is a heated topic in Germany as well as in Sweden, but the debates 
are emphasising rather diverse topics. The reason for these differences is 
according to us embedded in the societal non-acceptance/acceptance of salary 
disclosure. The Germans are very restrictive in publishing the salary amount 
earned, which in the majority of the cases is kept closely private. An interesting 
point is how the debate on the issue will develop itself in the future. Will it be 
custom and completely normal to disclose individual compensations even in 
Germany in about ten years or more and how will the debate be shaped then, will 
there still be some negative attitudes from the industry? Either way, it can be 
stated that the results from our article study support the statement made in an 
article in The Economist (2004-08-21). Germany is there said to be one of the 
laggards among Europe’s developed countries when it comes to the disclosure of 
board members’ compensations. A conclusion if Germany truly is the laggard 
among all European countries can’t completely be drawn, but Germany for sure is 
more of a laggard than many other countries, including Sweden. 
 
Based on our results, hypothesis 3a and 3b can be accepted. The German debate is 
emphasising the new law while the compensation levels are debated by Swedish 
media. The origin of the German debate was significantly most often the politic; 
we argue that the reason is due to the debate on legalisation, which took place 
during 2005. It’s however important to point out that in fully 42 % of the cases 
were the origins of the German debate the industry or media.  The origin sated in 
the hypotheses for Sweden was however false. We argued that media was implied 
to be an important origin of the Swedish debate. This turned out to be false; the 
Swedish debate was significantly rooted in the industry in 91 % of the cases and 
in the media in as few as 6 % of the cases. 
 
 
4.5 Female Directors on the Boards 
 
This aspect is viewed as the most recent in the corporate governance debate when 
considering the four aspects chosen for this study. A debate about female directors 
on the boards can’t be developed from one day to another without the emergence 
of a societal debate on the gender equality issue. The cultural background, social 
environment and custom mould people’s opinions, and thus the society’s view 
concerning social norms. The German society is designed in a way that makes 
most German couples choose to let the woman give up her carrier to be home with 
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the children, e.g. due to an united tax declaration and inflexible day-care. As a 
result of social democratic governance in Sweden for more than half a century, the 
Swedish society is designed differently. Women are encouraged to combine the 
family life with a carrier, resulting in competent women challenging the men for 
the top-seats.  
 
Are then women supposed to compete with the men for the top-seats on equally 
basis or are legislative actions necessary? Are women as competent as men? How 
difficult is it for women to reach the board seats in the two different corporate 
governance systems? These are just a few of several questions that emerge when 
managing the aspect. As earlier argued, media take a central role in the corporate 
governance debate, and hence are the results from the German and Swedish 
newspapers highly interesting. Let us review the hypothesis before analysing the 
results: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Female directors on the board of directors is debated  
                       in Swedish media more frequently than in German. 
 
Although there are many well educated women today, the proportion found at the 
universities, in the corporations and in the rest of the society is not reflected in the 
companies’ board structures. The lack of women on board seats is still obvious in 
both studied countries. If a change is supposed to occur in the future, it’s vital that 
the issue is debated not only by politicians, but also by the media, and most 
importantly, in the corporations.  
 
Our search for relevant articles resulted in 18 articles for Germany and 40 for 
Sweden. This implies that the topic is debated in Sweden more frequently than in 
Germany. The size of the articles however implies that no country is debating the 
subject significantly more than the other. The sizes of the German articles are 
distributed evenly while middle sized articles are dominating significantly in the 
Swedish paper. 
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Figure 5: Origin of the debate on the issue female directors. 
 
The origin of the debate differs significantly between the two countries, which can 
be seen in figure 5 above. Media is with its 61 % the distinctly most common 
origin of the debate in Germany (see appendix F). As earlier argued, the year 2005 
however was a special year in the German politics to some extent. Angela Merkel 
was elected for chancellor and thus the first female chancellor in the German 
history. As chancellor, she is one of the most powerful women in Germany (and 
the world) and serves as a role model and a source of inspiration for many 
women. That a woman was elected for chancellor has most probably affected our 
results, enhancing the political interest in the aspect. This could perhaps be the 
start of a future, more continuous, debate on female directors on the boards and 
increasing power of women in the corporations in Germany. 
 
As opposed to Germany is the origin of the Swedish debate dominated 
significantly by the politic and the industry. This significant difference of the 
debate’s origin could be explained by the way the topic is debated. While the 
German debate is focused on the percentage of women on the boards, the Swedish 
debate takes one step further and focuses on a potential law, regulating the 
minimum ratio of female directors on the boards. As a law, if established, would 
be implemented by the corporations, the industry clearly has an interest in the 
question as well. It’s thus natural that the Swedish debate is initiated by the 
politicians and the industry more often than the German. 
 
A significant difference between the German and Swedish articles is that the 
German articles don’t present any negative attitude. This result is most probably 
caused by the difference in focus between the two countries, mentioned above. 
We are of the opinion that it’s natural that the debate about the percentage of 
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female directors doesn’t cause as much negative attitudes as the establishment of a 
law. The establishment of legal constraints are more controversial and causes 
negative as well as positive attitudes. In spite of this, a neutral attitude is the 
significantly most common attitude in the Swedish articles and in 50 % of the 
German. We interpret this as the articles being rather informative in both 
countries.  
 
The effects experienced by the companies differ significantly between Germany 
and Sweden. A significant amount of the German articles state the companies to 
experience positive effects of female directors (see appendix F). In the Swedish 
articles on the other hand, the negative effects are pointed out more often than the 
positive. This could seem surprising, but we are of the opinion that the negative 
effects are related to the discussion of an establishment of a law. A law would 
limit the owners’ ability to exercise their rights to choose the board members they 
want, irrespectively of gender. We therefore find it probable that the industry has 
emphasised this as a negative effect for the companies. 
 
In view of what has been discussed in this section, the results point out that the 
debate in Sweden is positioned at a different level than the one held in Germany. 
The reason is rooted in the social and custom structures in the both countries. The 
German articles found were debating the women in the situation of choosing the 
traditional housewife role or a part/full time job to a larger extent than the 
Swedish. The German debates were often questioning if it’s possible to combine 
family with work, which actually isn’t what the fourth hypothesis is aiming to 
investigate. These articles were thus excluded from the study.  
 
Based on our results; the fourth and last hypothesis can be accepted. German 
media is not debating the presence/absence of female directors on the boards as 
frequently as Swedish media. Furthermore, we could reveal that the German 
debate had another focus than the Swedish. 
 
 
4.6 Summary 
 
The results from our study of the four aspects were presented and analysed in this 
chapter. The following results were found: 
 
Ownership structure 
• The banks are remaining strong owners in both countries, and the 
significantly most debated ownership type in Germany, while foreign 
investors are debated the most in Sweden.  
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• The debate taking place in the German newspaper discusses a decreasing 
power of major owners; in Sweden on the contrary, a debate on increasing 
power of the major owners is taking place.  
 
Employee representation on the boards 
• The co-determination is found to be well-debated and criticised in 
Germany due to experienced negative effects by the corporations. In 
Sweden, the debate is absent, which is interpreted as a lack of problems in 
this area. 
 
Disclosure of board members’ compensation  
• The disclosure of board members’ compensation is a heated topic in 
Germany, while the level of the compensations is the focus of the Swedish 
debate. 
 
Female directors on the boards 
• The debate of female directors on the boards was found to be more vivid 
in Sweden than in Germany. Moreover, the debates in Germany and 
Sweden had different focus. Societal and cultural differences between the 
two countries were implied to be the central reasons for the difference. 
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5 Concluding Discussion 
 
 
As the study has been conducted and the four crucial aspects have been analysed, 
it’s evident that important similarities and differences exist between the debates 
within the two systems. In this chapter, the results revealed and analysed in 
chapter 4, will be discussed further, related to previous studies and connected 
with each other. Furthermore, the convergence issue will be handled and the 
future development of the corporate governance debate in Germany and Sweden 
will be discussed. Final conclusions will be drawn, and topics/questions of 
interest for further research will be outlined. 
 
 
 
5.1 Connections between the Four Aspects 
 
s some connections between the four aspects will be discussed, the outline of 
this chapter is a bit different from the outline of previous chapters. First, the 
aspect ownership structure will be related with the three other aspects separately, 
in the normal order. Thereafter, the employee representation and compensation 
will be related with each other as well as the compensation with the female 
directors on the boards. Before the final conclusion will be drawn, a discussion 
about the convergence issue will take place.  
 
 
5.1.1 Ownership Structure - Employee Representation 
 
Our results revealed that banks and other financial institutions are the most 
debated ownership type in Germany. We are of the opinion that the fact that they 
are debated the most, imply that they still are the most important major owners in 
Germany. According to our literature review, their power consists of three crucial 
aspects; the banks are shareholders themselves, representatives of other 
shareholders (through proxy voting) and creditors. Banks thus have a better access 
to corporate information, decreasing their transaction costs and enhancing their 
monitoring ability. These aspects of power are supported by the frequent 
occurrence of cross-holdings, creating close relationships between the banks and 
the corporations (Almond et al. 2003; Hackethal et al. 2005; Lubatkin et al. 
2005). We consequently argue that it’s difficult for foreign investors to become 
major owners in the German corporations. This is in line with our result that one 
of the least debated ownership types is the foreign investors, which is interpreted 
A 
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as the foreign investors having a low interest in investing in German companies. 
 
Another factor that we point out as limiting the foreign investors’ interest in 
German corporations is the strong co-determination. We argue that the co-
determination constitutes a risk for the foreign investors due to the limitation of 
their ability to control the company, consequently the principal-agent problematic 
arise. As the foreign investors are unfamiliar with the system, the co-
determination and the overall outline of the German corporate governance system 
is enhancing their transaction costs as well, since they have to get familiar with it. 
The German corporations are consequently failing to secure the potential capital 
source that foreign investors represent. 
 
We are of the opinion that this explains the attitudes we found. The role of the 
major owners in Germany is debated to be decreasing as well as the co-
determination according to our results, which in our opinion imply that these 
aspects are less effective in the present international competition. We also argue 
that the co-determination will continue to evolve in the future as it’s creating 
hindrances for German corporations abroad, causing a significant amount of 
negative attitudes to be observed in the studied articles. Our opinion is also that 
the dominant co-determination observed in German corporations doesn’t give the 
impression to get changed in the closest future, despite the large amount of 
criticism found in our article study. The central reason for this argumentation is 
that the discussion about its abolition, according to an article in the Economist 
(2005-01-29), first started a couple of years ago and that it takes time to change 
laws. 
 
The co-determination is primarily aiming to decrease the principal-agent 
problematic taking place in the relationship between employees and management, 
above all due to interests’ conflicts. It moreover aims to increase the ability to 
monitor the management’s actions. However, our results point out that the co-
determination in Germany has caused problems in the corporations due to its 
inflexibility. We are thus concluding that the parties in the German society find 
that the disadvantages are larger than the advantages.  
 
Williamson (in Nygaard & Bengtsson 2002) argues that optimal contracts don’t 
exist due to the limited rationality of individuals, thus contracts constantly have to 
be adjusted to the new conditions and the dynamic international competition 
taking place today. These adjustments are costly which, according to us, can 
explain the absence of a considerable amount of foreign investors in the German 
debate. An additional factor that can make fast changes complicated in the future 
is the fact that the German corporate governance is an insider system, favouring 
long term relationships.   
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The situation in Sweden is similar to the one in Germany on some aspects but 
different on others. A similarity is that banks were found to be debated frequently 
in both countries. As our literature study revealed that banks are, and traditionally 
have been, powerful owners in both countries, we conclude that this is the 
explanation for this result. This similarity between the two countries therefore can 
be interpreted as the ownership structure remaining concentrated and thus 
supporting the classification of Sweden belonging to the Germanic corporate 
governance system. Furthermore, the central role of banks and the concentration 
of ownership in Germany and Sweden, which our empirical research presented, 
are consistent with the results from studies e.g. conducted by Hackethal et al. 
(2005); Mallin (2004); Weimer & Pape (1999).  
 
However, Sweden differ from Germany regarding foreign investors, which was 
the most debated ownership type in Sweden, but one of the least debated in 
Germany. In addition, the co-determination was not debated in Sweden, indicating 
that no larger problems with the co-determination exist in Sweden at the moment. 
A possible explanation for this could be the fact that the co-determination, legally 
seen, is weaker in Sweden. Levinson (2001) argue that the co-determination in 
Sweden is characterised by an involvement of employee representatives that is 
fruitful for the Swedish companies. Our opinion is that this could be the cause for 
the foreign investors to accept the design of the Swedish system, and therefore 
occur frequently in the Swedish debate.  
 
A second vital motive for the differences between the debates in the two countries 
is, according to us, the fact that there are diverging business cultures. The German 
corporate organisation is strongly hierarchical and the Swedish is more 
decentralised. We argue that the more decentralised working organisation in the 
Swedish corporations facilitates the communication and relationship between the 
employees and directors, consequently is a strong co-determination less needed 
and desired.  
 
 
5.1.2 Ownership Structure - Compensation  
 
In the literature study and according to our results and discussions above, 
Germany and Sweden have a concentrated ownership structure. Hackethal et al. 
(2005), among others, argue that the role of major owners is decreasing in 
Germany although this change takes place slowly. Our study revealed a similar 
debate taking place regarding the decreasing role of major owners in Germany, 
but indications of that a change already has taken place wasn’t found. We thus 
concluded that the German society is conservative and not capable of changing 
especially fast. 
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This conclusion is reinforced by our findings regarding the disclosure of board 
members’ compensation. The new law was argued to be criticised by the industry, 
opposing the law initiative. This despite that Germany, according to an article in 
the Economist (2004-08-21), is one of the last countries among the developed 
European countries to establish a law on individual disclosure of board members’ 
compensation. Germany is among others behind Britain, France, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Italy and Sweden. This states that the German corporate governance 
has a limited ability of going through fast changes. Nevertheless, a change has 
taken place since a new law has been established. 
 
Based on our results, we argue that the situation in Sweden is different. Sweden is 
a small market which stresses its dependence of well-established international 
trade and relationships. We therefore argue that, in the international aspect, it’s 
more important for Sweden to be flexible and open than for Germany, which can 
explain some of the results in this study. The results are on the other hand 
contradicting the difference in the two corporate governance definitions 
constructed by the Corporate Governance Committees in respectively country 
(discussed in chapter 2; section 2.1).  
 
It’s worth noting that the corporate governance definitions of the two countries 
were opposing the difference found in the content analysis, conducted in this 
thesis. The most important difference between the two definitions is that the 
German definition declares that corporate governance is supervising the 
companies on an international basis while the Swedish definition has not outlined 
such a characteristic. Our results reveal debates where the Swedish corporate 
governance is more flexible and international oriented than the German. We 
therefore argue that the definition might be an aware construction from the 
German committee’s side while the German corporate governance historically 
was considered as inflexible regarding certain aspects. An example of this is the 
German co-determination issue, which according to our results, evidently is 
inflexible and thus highly criticised in media.  
 
The results of our study on the compensation and ownership issue reveal that the 
compensation level and the foreign investors are the most debated topics in the 
Swedish media. We argue that the increased involvement of foreign investors in 
the Swedish companies and debate in the media is a probable cause for the 
developed debate on the compensation issue. A study conducted by Oxelheim and 
Randøy (2005) revealed that boards with foreign board members, commonly with 
the Anglo-Saxon system as origin, entails a higher compensation of the CEO. This 
could according to us be a possible reason for the debate on compensation level 
taking place in Sweden today.  
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5.1.3 Ownership Structure - Female Directors  
 
It’s here argued that the major reason for the diverged result presented for the 
female directors, is the fact that the societal development in Germany differs from 
that in Sweden. Today, there are generally not equally many women working 
outside of the home in Germany as in Sweden. We argue that this is rooted in the 
country’s custom, e.g. in the less developed day care in Germany. It’s custom that 
the children come home from the day care or school to eat lunch, and for that 
reason it’s normal that the mother stays home. The conservative, social structure 
in Germany can consequently not be changed over night, and so forth are women 
on top-management positions like board seats something uncommon and more or 
less extraordinary. Is it then possible to change this pattern? The answer from our 
side will be yes, but support from politicians, top-managers in the corporations 
and a general social acceptance is definitely needed. If the media in Germany will 
start (and continue) to report about the progresses in other countries, e.g. Norway, 
the debate, according to us, probably will start to flourish in Germany and the 
traditional social view can start to change slowly.  
 
The main reasons for the change in tax declaration in Sweden in 1970, abolishing 
the united tax declaration for married couples, was the increasing debate about 
equal rights for women and men, and the increased need for a larger work force 
(The Swedish Tax Authority). In Germany, on the other hand, married couples 
still carry out a united tax declaration. We argue that this is a fundamental reason 
for a large proportion of housewives in Germany and for the small amount of 
articles found in the content analysis. This indicates that the debate about the low 
proportion of women in German corporations is infrequent. The lower proportion 
of women in the workforce combined with the conservatism characterising 
Germany, has led to a slow promotion of women to the board seats (10 % 
according to Jayne 2005) and an almost non-existing debate on female directors 
on the German boards.  
 
One essential question from our side is; can Germany and the German 
corporations afford to continue the ignorance of vital and competent female 
working force without loosing competitive advantages and/or firm value? Carter 
et al. (2003) argued that there is a significant positive relationship between the 
percentage of women and the firm value. Based on their results, we argue that 
there is a risk that no changes will be undertaken if the percentage of women in 
the board rooms won’t be debated in the German media in the future. As a 
consequence, German firms will loose firm value and consequently competitive 
advantages. We are thus of the opinion that a debate on the issue is essential for 
the future development. 
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In an other study conducted by Burke & Vannicombe (2005) it’s argued that there 
is a risk with such a slow progress as in Germany, since educated and ambitious 
women will get a negative attitude towards the management and the profession as 
a career opportunity. Consequently, they argue that these women will leave the 
traditional organisations to become entrepreneurs. This study thus supports our 
opinion that the German media has to increase the debate on female directors on 
the boards and that the corporations have to take a more active role on the issue, 
since they otherwise will risk losing a competent work force. 
 
Brenner and Schwalbach (2003) found that German women making career were 
discriminated and that it primarily were large companies that employed them. Our 
opinion is that the larger companies naturally have a larger international influence, 
which often includes adoption of foreign corporate cultures. For that reason, the 
promotion of female directors on boards might be a favourable aspect in those 
companies. Our results regarding the ownership structure showed a high amount 
of articles debating non-financial owners, which we argued could be a sign of 
industrial events such as M&A’s to be frequent. Consequently, our opinion is that 
the fact that we found industrial events to be discussed frequently in media e.g. 
M&A’s of German and foreign corporations, implies that these activities occur 
frequently nowadays. Furthermore, we argue that the M&A’s are increasing the 
sizes of the corporations. Based on the results of Brenner and Schwalbach (2003), 
we therefore find it probable that the increasing firm size increases the chances of 
a more vivid debate about female directors on the German boards.  
 
We argue that the topic; female directors on the boards, unfortunately is a topic 
that, in the short term, won’t be shaping the future corporate governance debate in 
Germany to any larger extent. The reason is the lack of a tendency of a growing 
and vivid debate in Germany today, which our results stated. Our results point out 
that the issue however is extremely central in the Swedish corporate governance 
debate. Although the percentage of women on the boards hasn’t been put into law 
yet (June 2006), the debate will continue to flourish in the future. Even though the 
debate is more intense in Sweden than in Germany, both countries are presenting 
a similarly low average percentage of women on boards. This implies that there 
are still many changes to undertake.  
 
The difference between the debates about female directors on the boards in the 
two countries, can according to us be explained through the differences in 
ownership structure. As the ownership structure in Germany still today is found 
and debated to be characterised by a dominant role of the banks, we argue that 
Germany is conservative. This conservativeness could in turn be the cause for the 
lack of a debate on the female directors’ issue. Since the ownership structure is 
conservative, the issues debated also are of a conservative character. Rather than 
debating a higher involvement of women on higher management levels, the 
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disclosure of board members’ compensations is debated in Germany. Our opinion 
is that this somewhat conservative focus is based on the ownership structure since 
a less conservative ownership structure probably would have prevented it. A 
larger involvement of e.g. foreign investors in the debates could have a renewing 
effect on the German corporations. Foreigners’ ability to see things out of other 
perspectives than the traditional German owners’, due to their different cultural 
background, might change the present structure. 
 
Sweden could serve as an example on this aspect. The high involvement of 
foreign investors has slowly forced the traditionally strong owners in Sweden to 
change. This, in combination with the Swedish society, characterised by a, 
compared to Germany, high equality of opportunities between women and men, 
has led to a debate in Sweden that is more modern than the German. The Swedish 
government has stated that within two years time from 2002, female directors 
should constitute at least 25 % of the board members. A failure to reach this quota 
was stated to be followed by a legislated quota on the boards of at least 40 % of 
each gender. As a consequence, almost all of the concerned companies have 
enlarged their proportion of female directors. According to our results, the 
proposed law was debated extensively. In addition, based on our results, we argue 
that the industry takes a negative attitude and that this probably is due to the 
reduction of the owners’ rights that a law would cause. An establishment of the 
law would however make Sweden to one of the first countries in the world taking 
governmental actions to prevent discrimination in the boardrooms.  
 
Since Sweden and Norway are brought up as role models concerning the 
progresses made with the proportion of female directors on the boards, it’s 
difficult to expect that a country with a strong traditional women role like 
Germany would illustrate a burning debate in the media and high percentage of 
women on boards in the corporations.  That Germany even would come to the 
point of establishing a law on the issue in the shortcoming future, is doubtful 
according to us.   
 
A further question from our side is how and what action will be undertaken to 
make women’ access to the boardrooms easier. As the Swedish deputy prime 
minister said, legislation is necessary, or else the process for women to reach 50 
% of the board seats will take 150 years. However, we ask us the question if 
legislation truly is necessary or if the publication of newspaper articles about 
corporations having few women on the boards is sufficient to make an impact? 
We argue that the answer to this question is yes, publication is sufficient as the 
media moulds peoples opinion and corporations can loose its image and interest 
from competent women when the issue is ignored by the top-managers. This is 
however a topic for further research since it’s impossible to investigate this at the 
moment, because of the short existence of the single law (Norway) that is 
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established at this time. The overall benefits for the companies is however 
questionable as 93 % of 500 female managers in Sweden were against legislation 
in 2002 according to the results of a questionnaire (Svenska Dagbladet 2005-12-
27). 
 
 
5.1.4 Employee Representation – Compensation 
 
One of the advantages with co-determination, argued by Lewis et al. (2004), is the 
fact that the employees help monitoring the managers, who otherwise not always 
would work in the best interest of the shareholders (principal-agent problematic). 
We found results indicating that the co-determination in Germany still is strong 
and thus argue that the employees have had small interest in demanding disclosure 
of board members’ compensation, since they through the co-determination get 
access to information that isn’t transparent to the average stakeholder. This is in 
our opinion one reason for the long waiting period, before a law on disclosure of 
compensation got established in Germany. It seems questionable that the 
employees didn’t require this kind of information, but a possible explanation 
could be that those requests were announced. Yet, as the employee representatives 
never have full majority on the boards, these sorts of propositions couldn’t get 
established in the corporations voluntarily. Another possibility is that the 
disclosure of board members’ compensation was never an especially important 
subject for the employee representatives, instead were probably other employee 
related aspects more central.  
 
The topic of establishing a law on disclosure of board members’ compensations is 
not being debated in Sweden, according to our results, but viewed as something 
natural and positive for the shareholders, while the debate is intense in Germany. 
The debate on disclosure of board members’ compensation will, according to us, 
with great probability continue for a couple of years in Germany as it involves 
many parties and raises diverging attitudes in the debate. In Sweden, on the other 
hand, the compensation level is debated and will be debated further, as the 
Swedish media evidentially already debates it frequently today.  
 
 
5.1.5 Compensation – Female Directors 
 
In the study of Brenner and Schwalbach (2003), it was found that German women 
were discriminated in the working life considering their possibilities of getting 
employed. How the situation is when it comes to the salary levels between women 
and men is hard to tell since this kind of information isn’t disclosed in Germany. 
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As both Germany and Sweden now are about to establish a law on disclosure of 
board members’ compensation on individual level, the transparency is going to be 
enhanced. It will thus become easier for shareholders and stakeholders to get 
information about the salary levels of board members. This development could 
result in an increased awareness of the discrimination of women, under the 
assumption that discrimination exists, and any differences in salaries between 
female and male directors will be obvious. Furthermore, a more vivid debate 
could take place on the issue in Germany, if the German society is open for such a 
debate. The issue is already debated in Sweden, but could take a new dimension 
as well. 
 
 
5.1.6 The Convergence Discussion 
 
As the four hypotheses now have been examined, analysed and connections 
between the four hypotheses have been made, there is an interesting aspect left, 
namely the convergence issue. Is a convergence towards one united corporate 
governance system possible? Can it at all be stated that there is an optimal 
system? 
 
Lewis et al. (2004) argue that the globalisation and the following increased flow 
of capital across boarders and growth of international investors are powerful 
forces pushing for a convergence of the global corporate governance systems. 
They are however of the opinion that the diversity of governance structures and 
the difference in employee participation across the EU-countries make a 
convergence difficult and possibly costly. This is in line with the result of our 
study. We found that the strong co-determination in Germany was debated 
frequently, while the interest from foreign investors was indicated to be weak as 
this ownership type was found to be debated infrequently (second smallest of the 
German ownership types). 
 
Hackethal et al. (2005) state that the function of the co-determination in Germany 
has not changed during the past decade, and further argue that the main 
characteristics of the traditional German system as a whole are still more or less 
the same. A transition towards a more modern capital market-based outsider 
system (the US/UK) is not yet in sight according to Hackethal et al. (2005). The 
studies conducted by Lewis et al. (2004), Hackethal et al. (2005) and the results 
from the German media in our study on the co-determination subject stress the 
problematic of the co-determination’s inflexibility, and we therefore argue that it 
creates a hindrance in a convergence process. 
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In a study conducted by Mintz (2005) it’s argued that a true convergence of the 
corporate governance systems is impossible, given the differences in underlying 
financing and cultural variables in countries such as the US and UK, and 
Germany. Cultural differences were revealed and one essential aspect explaining 
the differences of the debates in our study. These cultural differences are 
according to us stressing the complexity of fully uniting the two systems. Our 
results of the media moreover outlined a difference in the ability of the systems to 
change, i.e. the systems’ flexibility and thus their ability to undergo a change.  
 
The market-based model (UK/US) is aiming at short term performance 
concerning the design of corporate goals while the group-based model (Germany 
& Sweden) is aiming at long term. The results in our study showed debates on a 
high concentration of major owners in both Germany and Sweden and an 
established debate on co-determination in Germany, which we argue stress the 
importance of having long term relationships and goals. The UK/US-companies 
prefer fast results while the German and Swedish systems consider the survival of 
the companies in the long reaching future as more essential, e.g. the major owners 
hold on to their companies even in bad times (Dagens Industri 2006-05-29). 
 
There are although some studies (Carati & Tourani Rad 2000) that point out that a 
general convergence between the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon systems is taking 
place. They are questioning the group-based system in the new economic 
environment and consequently suggesting a convergence towards the Anglo-
Saxon model. In our opinion, the recently established compensation law in 
Germany can be interpreted as a step towards the more shareholder-oriented 
system. Moreover, industrial events such as M&A’s are debated in the media of 
both countries, which can be interpreted as a sign of a development towards the 
Anglo-Saxon system. According to Weimer and Pape (1999) is an active takeover 
market a central characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system 
and mergers are one of the most familiar techniques.  
 
The differences in the corporate governance systems that were found in the 
hypotheses of female directors on the boards, the compensations of board 
members’ and, to a certain extent, the employee representation, were according to 
us rooted in clear societal differences. Societal differences like those explained in 
our study make a convergence towards a united system problematic. It’s moreover 
difficult for us to conclude if a complete convergence between the German and 
Swedish systems is possible in the future. We can however state that despite the 
globalisation and weakened role of national boarders, a complete convergence 
does seem unlikely in the near future.  
 
According to us, it’s furthermore doubtful that the discovered differences between 
the debates of the media on the four studied aspects will even out in the short 
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coming future. In the early phase of the thesis was it discussed if Sweden truly fits 
in the Germanic corporate governance system, which Weimer & Pape (1999) 
argue that it does, or rather takes a more accurate position between the Germanic 
and Anglo-Saxon system (Albert-Roulhac & Breen 2005; Swedish Corporate 
Governance Code 2005). The analysis of the debate in the media on the four 
aspects showed some clear differences and similarities between the two countries, 
but since we haven’t conducted research for the Anglo-Saxon system, it’s not 
possible for us to argue that Sweden is more correctly positioned in the Anglo-
Saxon system than in the Germanic. 
 
Rebérioux (2002) argue that the diversity of the corporate governance systems is 
valuable, and is rooted in societal characteristics that together shape the 
competitiveness of the different corporate governance systems in Europe. He also 
points out that the corporate and labour laws are underestimated when grasping 
the convergence problematic and discussion. His conclusions might support our 
findings, as the majority of the differences between the debates on the German 
and Swedish systems were rooted in societal or cultural characteristics. In our 
opinion, the question if a truly optimal system exists is comprehensive, especially 
when the societal and cultural aspects are considered. The national corporate laws, 
corporate governance codes and debates concerning corporate governance issues 
are diverse in both countries and designed specifically for/in each country due to 
historical developments, cultural background and degree of international 
dependence. In this connection we argue that an optimal corporate governance 
system is comprehensive and/or even impossible to establish due to the 
difficulties of changing a system completely, converging it with another and thus 
ignoring cultural and societal differences.  
 
 
5.2 Conclusion 
 
In the early phase of the thesis, the central role that media play in the corporate 
governance debate and their monitoring task was stressed. Moreover, at present 
there is an evident lack of studies of this kind, i.e. studies of the corporate 
governance systems from media’ point of view. For these central reasons has this 
study been conducted.  
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate how much interest German and 
Swedish media shows corporate governance with emphasis on the four aspects; 
ownership structure, employee representation on the boards, disclosure of board 
members’ compensation and female directors on the boards. Furthermore, the four 
aspects were selected and studied as they handle diverging, relevant and burning 
aspects of the international corporate governance debate. Our aim was to graze the 
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current development in the corporate governance debate, taking place in the two 
countries, through studying the four aspects. The role of media hence was 
especially important in this study. Finally, the differences and similarities between 
the two systems have been studied as well as, the reasons and consequences of 
their occurrence discussed, and the convergence problematic was brought up for 
discussion.  
 
Based on the debates on the four aspects in the German and Swedish media, the 
conclusion of the study is that the German corporate governance system, 
compared to the Swedish system, is less flexible and has more problems to be 
competitive and keep up with the international competition. The main reasons for 
this is that the German debate regarding the ownership structure shows a more 
complex ownership structure due to cross-holdings and dominant owners, above 
all the banks. We argue that, in combination with the vivid debate on the 
prominent co-determination, it leads to a weak interest from foreign investors in 
German corporations. In addition, based on our results, we argue that the industry 
in Germany is very conservative and argues strongly against an individual 
disclosure of board members’ compensation. As opposed to the industry, our 
results imply that the politicians argue for a modernisation of the system, among 
other things through establishing a law of disclosing compensation.  
 
In alignment with the results found in this study, it’s interesting to observe that the 
German definition of corporate governance is formulated with the purpose of 
opening up for influences from international systems. After conducting this study, 
we argue that the reason for this formulation is not as questionable as it was 
before, since we come to the conclusion that the German system is less flexible. 
We therefore find it natural that the German corporate governance committee has 
formulated the definition in a way that opens up for future changes. Another 
factor contributing to the picture of the German corporate governance system 
being more conservative than the Swedish is the absence of a vivid debate on the 
topic female directors on the boards. 
 
The topics debated in the Swedish media are rather different than in the German. 
The Swedish debate on the ownership structure is characterised by traditional 
owners such as interest spheres and banks, even though foreign investors is the 
most debated ownership type. In our opinion, vital reason for the foreign 
investors’, compared to Germany, frequent occurrence in the Swedish debate is 
the rather weak co-determination in Sweden. Consequently, we argue that the 
media forms a picture of the Swedish system as being more flexible than the 
German, indicating an enhanced competitiveness of the Swedish system. In 
contrast to Germany, Sweden is less conservative on the compensation issue due 
to the well established right of public access to official records. The legislation 
issue was therefore not criticised and thus not debated in Sweden. Our opinion is 
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that the public access to official records makes the Swedish system more 
transparent than the German. This in turn decreases the transaction costs 
associated with investments in Swedish corporations, and thus increases the 
investors’ will to invest in Swedish firms.   
 
The international trend of more and more women working at the higher levels of 
the corporations has caused a debate on the ratio of female directors on the 
boards. Sweden is seen as one of the leading countries in the world in this aspect, 
debating a possible establishment of a law. However, our results revealed that the 
initiative to legislate is met of a debate with mixed opinions, pointing out as well 
positive as negative effects for the concerned companies. These results oppose to 
the modest debate on the issue taking place in Germany. 
 
Despite the differences between the debates in Germany and Sweden, revealed in 
this study, the traditional similarities such as a high ownership concentration, 
characterising the insider system, are found to be remaining when reviewing the 
topics discussed by media. As this is the only strong similarity that we found 
between the debates in these two countries, we argue that the position of the 
Swedish system in the Germanic corporate governance system remains 
questionable. According to our results, the Swedish system moreover is found to 
be less stakeholder-oriented than the German, due to the weak co-determination 
and the tradition to disclose information such as the compensation of board 
members. 
 
If a convergence is to take place between the different corporate governance 
systems in the future is difficult for us to conclude. Evidently, the two studied 
systems are changing. The major difference is the speed and the attitudes towards 
these changes, which according to the picture constructed by the media are 
diverging between the two systems. Our opinion is that the future development of 
the debate depends on how the actors on the German and Swedish markets decide 
to handle these changes. We also argue that on the one hand, the two systems 
could converge with each other and form a modernised version of the Germanic 
corporate governance system. On the other hand, a convergence towards the 
Anglo-Saxon system is imaginable for both countries, even if it’s more likely that 
Sweden develops in this direction since it’s less stakeholder-oriented.  
 
Our study can be useful in further research concerning the international corporate 
governance debate, especially when the aim is to investigate the relationship 
between the German and the Swedish systems.  
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5.3 Further Research 
 
When conducting the research several new and interesting angles of the 
international corporate governance got brought up. As the corporate governance is 
an essential, ongoing and developing area are there several aspects still left 
undiscovered and many questions remain unanswered and new ones have evolved 
meanwhile. Foremost comparisons of smaller markets/countries like Sweden, 
Poland, Switzerland, and Norway with larger, e.g. Germany, the US or UK are 
attractive to accomplish in further studies. Proposals of possible interesting 
research topics follow below: 
 
 A comparison of the German and Swedish corporate governance systems 
but emphasising other aspects than those chosen for this study. New 
possible aspects could be; minority groups represented on the boards, 
independency and objectivity of board members, the auditor’s role etc. 
Furthermore, a comparison on the Corporate Governance Codes of the two 
countries could be accomplished. 
 
 Conduct a deeper comparison of the topics debated in the German and 
Swedish media, by only choosing one aspect, e.g. ownership structure, and 
conduct a more comprehensive and detailed study on that aspect.  
 
 An interesting aspect would be to investigate if German corporations that 
are more decentralised also have a different ownership structure and more 
flexible co-determination. 
 
 Investigate problems and attitudes among international corporations’ 
concerning specific corporate governance aspects. Compare annual reports 
of different lines of businesses and countries. Why and how are certain 
aspects presented and/or not being presented? 
 
 Since it can be argued that Sweden is positioned somewhere in between 
the Germanic and the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance systems would a 
similar study like the one conducted in this thesis be interesting comparing 
the British and Swedish media debate on corporate governance systems.  
 
 The method and coding variables could have been chosen and carried out 
in a different way. Relevant newspapers could have been Handelsblatt 
(Germany) and Dagens Industri (Sweden), which both have a clearer 
industry focus. A different and/or longer time period could be favourable, 
especially if the codes are to be compared.  
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 A more comprehensive research on the convergence issue. Is a 
convergence of the British, German and Swedish corporate governance 
possible? What are the possibilities and which constrains exist at the 
moment? Are the different corporate governance systems favouring 
globalisation and financial mobility, what can make them even more 
attractive? How do media treat these issues? 
 
 In what way is the corporate governance in the new member countries of 
the EU (e.g. Poland, Czech, Hungary, Slovenia) differing compared to the 
Western European countries?  
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Appendix A: Code Manual 
 
Hypothesis 1: Ownership structure 
I. Article size  
        Small (1) = 0-150 words  
        Middle (2) = 151-500 words 
        Large (3) = 501 words or more 
II. Who/What has caused the newspaper to write an article on the issue? 
        Politic (1) = political actions and statements made by politicians 
        Industry (2) = industrial actions, documents published by the industry and statements made 
                               by industrial organisations  
        Media (3) = media has investigated the issue or of some other cause chosen to report about 
              it 
        Public (4) = private persons actions and statements made by private persons 
        Unknown (5) = the cause of the article is not known and cannot be interpreted 
III. Support for major owners  
        Negative attitude (1) = Explicit as well as implicit statements with a negative attitude 
        Neutral/None (2) = No attitude is stated and cannot be interpreted 
        Positive attitude (3) = Explicit as well as implicit statements with a positive attitude  
        Both attitudes are represented (4) = Statements pro and contra are made explicitly or 
              implicitly 
IV. The role of banks and financial institutions is debated 
        Yes (1), No (2) 
V. The role of non-financial owners (companies) is debated 
        Yes (1), No (2) 
VI. The role of families and private owners is debated (Included in this group are individuals and 
              families that have founded the company or acquired control over a company.) 
        Yes (1), No (2) 
VII. The role of interest spheres is debated (Firms controlled by a group of shareholders sharing 
              interests are divided into this category.) 
        Yes (1), No (2) 
VIII. The role of foreign investors is debated (This group consists of all companies controlled by 
              a foreign investor, independent of what kind of investor it is.) 
        Yes (1), No (2) 
IX. The role of the public sector is debated (Government controlled firms and firms controlled by 
              municipalities belong in this group.) 
        Yes (1), No (2) 
X. In what way is the role of traditionally strong owners changing 
        Decreasing power (1) = it is stressed that the power is decreasing or actions that decreases 
              the power is reported 
        Maintain (2) = it is stressed that the power is maintained or actions that maintains the 
              power is reported 
        Increasing power (3) = it is stressed that the power is increasing or actions that increases the 
              power is reported 
        Both decreasing & increasing power (4) = it is both stressed that the power is decreasing 
              and that it’s increasing and/or actions that decreases and increases the power is reported 
        Unknown (5) = no statements about the power of traditionally strong owners are made  
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Hypothesis 2: Employee representation on the boards 
XI. Article size  
        Small (1) = 0-150 words  
        Middle (2) = 151-500 words 
        Large (3) = 501 words or more 
XII. Who/What has caused the newspaper to write an article on the issue? 
        Politic (1) = political actions and statements made by politicians 
        Industry (2) = industrial actions, documents published by the industry and statements made 
              by industrial organisations  
        Media (3) = media has investigated the issue or of some other cause chosen to report about 
              it 
        Public (4) = private persons actions and statements made by private persons 
        Unknown (5) = the cause of the article is not known and cannot be interpreted 
XIII. Support for employee representation 
        Negative attitude (1) = Explicit as well as implicit statements with a negative attitude 
        Neutral/None (2) = No attitude is stated and cannot be interpreted 
        Positive attitude (3) = Explicit as well as implicit statements with a positive attitude  
        Both attitudes are represented (4) = Statements pro and contra are made explicitly or 
              implicitly 
XIV. In what way is the power of employee representation changing/wished to change? 
        Decreasing power (1) = it is stressed that the power is decreasing or actions that decreases 
              the power is reported 
        Maintain (2) = it is stressed that the power is maintained or actions that maintains the 
              power is reported 
        Increasing power (3) = it is stressed that the power is increasing or actions that increases the 
              power is reported 
        Both decreasing & increasing power (4) = it is both stressed that the power is decreasing 
              and that it’s increasing and/or actions that decreases and increases the power is reported 
        Unknown (5) = no statements about the power of traditionally strong owners are made 
XV. The positive effects of employee representation experienced by the company are debated. 
        Yes (1), No (2) 
XVI. The negative effects of employee representation experienced by the company are debated. 
        Yes (1), No (2) 
 
Hypothesis 3: Disclosure of board members’ compensation 
XVII. Article size  
        Small (1) = 0-150 words  
        Middle (2) = 151-500 words 
        Large (3) = 501 words or more 
XVIII. Who/What has caused the newspaper to write an article on the issue? 
        Politic (1) = political actions and statements made by politicians 
        Industry (2) = industrial actions, documents published by the industry and statements made 
              by industrial organisations  
        Media (3) = media has investigated the issue or of some other cause chosen to report about 
              it 
        Public (4) = private persons actions and statements made by private persons 
        Unknown (5) = the cause of the article is not known and cannot be interpreted 
XIX. Support for disclosure of board members’ compensation. 
        Negative attitude (1) = Explicit as well as implicit statements with a negative attitude 
        Neutral/None (2) = No attitude is stated and cannot be interpreted 
        Positive attitude (3) = Explicit as well as implicit statements with a positive attitude  
        Both attitudes are represented (4) = Statements pro and contra are made explicitly or 
              implicitly 
XX. In what way is the disclosure of board members’ compensation debated? 
        Legislation (1) = it is discussed whether there should be legal constraints or not 
        Compensation level (2) = the level of compensations is discussed in some way or plainly 
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              reported 
        Both legislation and compensation level (3) = it is both discussed whether there should be 
              legal constraints or not and the level of compensations is discussed or plainly reported 
        Other (4) = all other issues discussed concerning board members’ compensation 
XXI. The positive effects of disclosure of board members’ compensation experienced by the 
company are debated. 
        Yes (1), No (2) 
XXII. The negative effects of disclosure of board members’ compensation experienced by the 
company are debated. 
        Yes (1), No (2) 
 
Hypothesis 4: Female directors on the boards 
XXIII. Article size  
        Small (1) = 0-150 words  
        Middle (2) = 151-500 words 
        Large (3) = 501 words or more 
XXIV. Who/What has caused the newspaper to write an article on the issue? 
        Politic (1) = political actions and statements made by politicians 
        Industry (2) = industrial actions, documents published by the industry and statements made 
              by industrial organisations  
        Media (3) = media has investigated the issue or of some other cause chosen to report about 
              it 
        Public (4) = private persons actions and statements made by private persons 
        Unknown (5) = the cause of the article is not known and cannot be interpreted 
XXV. Support for female directors on boards 
        Negative attitude (1) = Explicit as well as implicit statements with a negative attitude 
        Neutral/None (2) = No attitude is stated and cannot be interpreted 
        Positive attitude (3) = Explicit as well as implicit statements with a positive attitude  
        Both attitudes are represented (4) = Statements pro and contra are made explicitly or 
              implicitly 
XXVI. In what way are female directors on the boards debated? 
        Legislation (1) = it is discussed whether there should be legal constraints or not        
        Percentage (2) = the percentage of female directors on the boards is discussed in some way 
              or plainly reported 
        Both legislation and percentage (3) = it is both discussed whether there should be legal 
              constraints or not and the percentage of female directors on the boards is some way or 
              plainly reported 
        Other (4) = all other issues discussed concerning female directors on the boards 
XXVII. The positive effects of female directors on the boards experienced by the company are 
debated. 
        Yes (1), No (2) 
XXVIII. The negative effects of female directors on the boards experienced by the company are 
debated. 
        Yes (1), No (2) 
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Appendix B: Key Words 
 
The key words presented below are the key words used when relevant articles 
were found, all other key words are left out. 
 
Germany (Die Welt)   Sweden (SvD) 
 
Hypothesis 1     Hypothesis 1 
Beteiligungsverhältnisse    Ägarstruktur 
Eigentumsverhältnisse    Huvudägare 
Hauptanteilseigner    Storägare - huvudägare 
Haupteigentümer 
Besitzwechsel 
Beteiligung der Banken 
Depotstimmrecht 
Beteiligung der Familien 
Beteiligung der ausländische  
Verflechtung 
Beteiligung von Bankinstitute 
Anteilsverhältnisse 
       
      
Hypothesis 2     Hypothesis 2 
Mitbestimmung    Medbestämmandelagen 
unternehmerische Mitbestimmung 
Arbeitnehmervertreter im Aufsichtsrat 
       
 
Hypothesis 3     Hypothesis 3 
Managergehälter    Bonus+styrelse 
Vorstandsbezüge    Ersättning+styrelse 
Offenlegung Gehälter   Incitamentsprogram  
Offenlegung Vergütung   Kompensation+styrelse 
Offenlegung Aufsichtsrat   Storägare 
 
 
Hypothesis 4     Hypothesis 4 
Frauen im Aufsichtsrat   Kvotering 
Frauen im Vorstand    Kvinnor i styrelser 
Managerin     Kvinnoandel 
Gleichberechtigung    Jämställdhet 
Frauen als Direktoren 
Top Managerinnen 
Frauenquote 
Frauenanteil 
Frauen bei Führungspositionen 
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Appendix C: Diagrams and Tables for Hypothesis 1 
 
Amount of articles found for hypothesis 1: Ownership structure 
Germany: 50 
Sweden: 80 
 
Article Size
6%
58%
36%
5%
83,8%
11,3%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Small Middle Large
Germany Sweden
 
Diagram 1: Size of the articles. 
 
 
 Germany 
 
Sweden 
  Observed N Expected N Observed N Expected N 
Small 3 16,7 4 26,7 
Middle 29 16,7 67 26,7 
Large 18 16,7 9 26,7 
Total 50   80   
     
Chi-Square 20,440  91,975 
df 2  2 
Asymp. Sig. ,000 
 
 ,000 
 
Tabel 1: Result of the chi-square test for the variable ”article size”. 
 
 
Variable Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Sig. (Equal 
variances 
assumed) 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
(Equal variances 
not assumed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Article size Germany 50 2,30 ,580    
 Sweden 80 
 
2,06 
 
,401 
 
,000 
 
,013 
 
,237 
 
Tabel 2: Result of the t-test for the variable ”article size”. 
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Figure 6: Origin of the debated issues in Germany and Sweden.  
 
 
 Germany 
 
Sweden 
  Observed N Expected N Observed N Expected N 
Politic 4 16,7 1 40,0 
Industry 43 16,7 79 40,0 
Media 3 16,7 - -  
Total 50   80  
      
Chi-Square  62,440  76,050 
df  2  1 
Asymp. Sig. 
 
,000 
 
 ,000 
 
Tabel 3: Result of the chi-square test for the variable ”origin of the debate”. 
 
 
Variable Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Sig. (Equal 
variances 
assumed) 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
(Equal variances 
not assumed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Cause Germany 50 1,98 ,377    
 Sweden 80 
 
1,99 
 
,112 
 
,002 
 
,892 
 
-,008 
 
Tabel 4: Result of the t-test for the variable ”origin of the debate”. 
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Diagram 2: Observed attitudes towards major owners. 
 
 
 Germany 
 
Sweden 
  Observed N Expected N Observed N Expected N 
Negative 
attitude 
14 15,7 4 26,0 
Neutral/ 
None 
20 15,7 73 26,0 
Positive 
attitude 
13 15,7 1 26,0 
Total 47   78   
     
Chi-Square 1,830  127,615 
df 2  2 
Asymp. Sig. ,401 
 
 ,000 
 
Tabel 5: Result of the chi-square test for the variable ”support”. 
 
 
Variable Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Sig. (Equal 
variances 
assumed) 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
(Equal variances 
not assumed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Support Germany 47 1,98 ,766    
 Sweden 78 
 
1,96 
 
,252 
 
,000 
 
,882 
 
,017 
 
Tabel 6: Result of the t-test for the variable ”support”. 
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Figure 7: The major owners being debated in German and Swedish newspapers. 
 
 
 
 Germany Sweden 
  Obs. N Exp. N Obs. N Exp. N 
Banks etc. 31 16,4 27 22,0 
Non-financial 20 16,4 25 22,0 
Families etc. 6 16,4 17 22,0 
Interest spheres - - 20 22,0 
Foreign investors 10 16,4 32 22,0 
Public sector 15 16,4 11 22,0 
Total 82   132   
    
Chi-Square 23,000 12,909 
df 4 5 
Asymp. Sig. ,000 
 
,024 
 
Tabel 7: Results of the chi-square test for the variable “role of …”. 
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Diagram 3: Changing role of major owners. 
 
 
 Germany 
 
Sweden 
  Observed N Expected N Observed N Expected N 
Decreasing 
power 
18 10,0 8 16,3 
Maintain 4 10,0 6 16,3 
Increasing 
power 
8 10,0 35 16,3 
Total 30   49   
     
Chi-Square 10,400  32,122 
df 2  2 
Asymp. Sig. ,006 
 
 ,000 
 
Tabel 8: Result of the chi-square test for the variable ”in what way is the role of major owners 
changing?”. (The variables “both” and “unknown” are excluded since they are irrelevant for the 
test.) 
 
 
Variable Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Sig. (Equal 
variances 
assumed) 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
(Equal variances 
not assumed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Changing Germany 30 1,67 ,884    
 Sweden 49 
 
2,55 
 
,765 
 
,080 
 
,000 
 
-,884 
 
Tabel 9: Result of the t-test for the variable ”in what way is the role of major owners changing?”. 
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 X 
Appendix D: Diagrams and Tables for Hypothesis 2 
 
Amount of articles found for hypothesis 2: Employee representation on the 
boards 
Germany: 47 
Sweden: 1 
 
Article Size
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Diagram 4: Size of the articles. 
 
 
 
Germany 
  Observed N Expected N 
Small 1 15,7 
Middle 26 15,7 
Large 20 15,7 
Total 47   
   
Chi-Square 21,745 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. ,000 
 
Tabel 10: Result of the chi-square test for the variable ”article size”. (Sweden is excluded since 
only one article was found.) 
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Figure 8: Origin of the debated issues in Germany (Sweden is excluded since only one relevant 
article was found). 
 
 
 
 
Germany 
  Observed N Expected N 
Politic 11 15,0 
Industry 11 15,0 
Media 23 15,0 
Total 45   
   
Chi-Square 6,400 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. ,041 
 
Tabel 11: Result of the chi-square test for the variable “origin of the debate”. (The variable 
“unknown” is excluded due to its irrelevance for the chi-square test while Sweden is 
excluded since only one article was found.) 
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Diagram 5: Observed attitudes towards employee representatives. 
 
 
 
 
Germany 
  Observed N Expected N 
Negative 
attitude 
21 13,0 
Neutral/ 
None 
7 13,0 
Positive 
attitude 
11 13,0 
Total 39   
   
Chi-Square 8,000 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. ,018 
 
Tabel 12: Result of the chi-square test for the variable “support”. (Sweden is excluded since only 
one article was found.) 
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Diagram 6: Focus of the debate about the power of employee representatives. 
 
 
 
 
Germany 
  Observed N Expected N 
Decreasing 
power 
25 10,0 
Maintain 4 10,0 
Increasing 
power 
1 10,0 
Total 30   
   
Chi-Square 34,200 
df 2 
Asymp. Sig. ,000 
 
Tabel 13: Result of the chi-square test for the variable ”in what way is the role of the employee 
representation changing?”. (Sweden is excluded since only one article was found.) 
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 XIV 
The Negative and Positive Effects of Employee 
Representation on the Boards experienced by the 
Company
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Diagram 7: Standing point towards the effects of employee representation on the boards reviewed 
by the newspapers.  
 
 
 
 
Germany 
  Observed N Expected N 
Negative 
effects 
27 19,5 
Positive 
effects 
12 19,5 
Total 39   
   
Chi-Square 5,769 
df 1 
Asymp. Sig. ,016 
 
Tabel 14: Result of the chi-square test for the variables ”negative effects” and “positive effects”. 
(Sweden is excluded since only one article was found.) 
 
International Corporate Governance 
A Comparison of the Corporate Governance Systems in Germany and Sweden 
 
 
 XV 
Appendix E: Diagrams and Tables for Hypothesis 3 
 
Amount of articles found for hypothesis 3: Disclosure of board members’ 
compensation 
Germany: 33 
Sweden: 34 
 
Article Size
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Diagram 8: Size of the articles. 
 
 
Germany 
 
Sweden 
 Observed N Expected N Observed N Expected N 
Small 4 11,0 4 11,3 
Middle 21 11,0 22 11,3 
Large 8 11,0 8 11,3 
Total 33   34   
   
Chi-Square 14,364 15,765 
df 2 2 
Asymp. Sig. ,001 
 
,000 
 
Tabel 15: Result of the chi-square test for the variable “article size”. 
 
 
Tabel 16: Result of the t-test for the variable ”article size”. 
Variable Country N Mean 
Std. 
Dev 
 
Sig. (Equal 
variances 
assumed) 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
(Equal variances 
not assumed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Article size Germany 33 2,12 ,600    
 Sweden 34 
 
2,12 
 
,591 
 
,915 
 
,981 
 
,004 
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Figure 9: Origin of the debate on the compensation issue. 
 
 
 
Germany Sweden 
 Observed N Expected N Observed N Expected N 
Politic 19 11,0 - - 
Industry 10 11,0 31 11,3 
Media 4 11,0 2 11,3 
Public - - 1 11,3 
Total 33   34   
  
Chi-Square 10,364 51,235 
df 2 2 
Asymp. Sig. ,006 
 
,000 
 
Tabel 17: Result of the chi-square test for the variable “origin of the debate”. 
 
 
Variable Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Sig. (Equal 
variances 
assumed 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
Mean 
Difference 
Cause Germany 33 1,55 ,711    
  Sweden 34 
 
2,12 
 
,409 
 
,000 
 
,000 
 
-,572 
 
Tabel 18: Result of the t-test for the variable ”origin of the debate”. 
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Diagram 9: Observed attitudes towards disclosure of board members’ compensation. 
 
 
 
 
Germany Sweden 
  Observed N Expected N Observed N Expected N 
Negative 
attitude 
10 8,0 - - 
Neutral/ 
None 
1 8,0 23 17,0 
Positive 
Attitude 
13 8,0 11 17,0 
Total 24   34   
   
Chi-Square 9,750 4,235 
df 2 1 
Asymp. Sig. ,008 
 
,040 
 
Tabel 19: Result of the chi-square test for the variable “support”. 
 
 
Variable Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Sig. (Equal 
variances 
assumed 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
Mean 
Difference 
Support Germany 24 2,13 ,992    
  Sweden 34 
 
2,32 
 
,475 
 
,000 
 
,370 
 
-,199 
 
Tabel 20: Result of the t-test for the variable “support”. 
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Diagram 10: Focus of the debate about disclosure of board members’ compensations. 
 
 
The Negative and Positive Effects of Disclosure of 
Board Members' Compensation Experienced by the 
Company
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Diagram 11: Standing point towards the effects of disclosure of board members’ compensation 
reviewed by the newspapers.  
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 XIX 
 
 
Germany Sweden 
  Observed N Expected N Observed N Expected N 
Negative 
effects 
7 7,0 1 1,0 
Positive 
effects 
7 7,0 1 1,0 
Total 14   2   
    
Chi-Square ,000 ,000 
df 1 1 
Asymp. Sig. 1,000 
 
1,000 
 
Tabel 21: Result of the chi-square test for the variables “negative effects” and “positive effects”. 
 
 
Variable Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Sig. (Equal 
variances 
assumed 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
Mean 
Difference 
Effects Germany 14 1,50 ,519    
 Sweden 2 
 
1,50 
 
,707 
 
- 
 
1,000 
 
,000 
 
Tabel 22: Result of the t-test for the variables “negative effects” and “positive effects”. 
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Appendix F: Diagrams and Tables for Hypothesis 4 
 
Amount of articles found for hypothesis 4: Female directors on the boards 
Germany: 18 
Sweden: 40 
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Diagram 12: Size of the articles. 
 
 
Germany 
 
Sweden 
 Observed N Expected N Observed N Expected N 
Small 5 6,0 4 13,3 
Middle 6 6,0 29 13,3 
Large 7 6,0 7 13,3 
Total 18   40   
      
Chi-Square ,333   27,950 
df 2   2 
Asymp. Sig. ,846 
 
  ,000 
 
Tabel 23: Result of the chi-square test for the variable ”article size”. 
 
Variable Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Sig. (Equal 
variances 
assumed 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
Mean 
Difference 
Article size Germany 18 2,11 ,832    
 Sweden 40 
 
2,08 
 
,526 
 
,003 
 
,867 
 
,036 
 
Tabel 24: Result of the t-test for the variable ”article size”. 
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Figure 10: Origin of the debate on the female directors issue. 
 
 
Germany 
 
Sweden 
 Observed N Expected N Observed N Expected N 
Politic 4 6,0 17 10,0 
Industry 3 6,0 15 10,0 
Media 11 6,0 7 10,0 
Public - - 1 10,0 
Total 18   40  
       
Chi-Square 6,333   16,400 
df 2   3 
Asymp. Sig. ,042 
 
  ,001 
 
Tabel 25: Result of the chi-square test for the variable ”Origin of the debate”. 
 
 
Variable Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Sig. (Equal 
variances 
assumed 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
Mean 
Difference 
Cause Germany 18 2,39 ,850    
 Sweden 40 
 
1,80 
 
,823 
 
,582 
 
,019 
 
,239 
 
Tabel 26: Result of the t-test for the variable ”Origin of the debate”. 
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Diagram 13: Observed attitudes towards female directors on the boards. 
 
 
 Germany 
 
Sweden 
  Observed N Expected N Observed N Expected N 
Negative 
attitude 
  6 11,3 
Neutral/ 
None 
9 9,0 20 11,3 
Positive 
attitude 
9 9,0 8 11,3 
Total 18  34  
     
Chi-Square ,000 10,118 
df 1 2 
Asymp. Sig. 1,000 
 
 
,006 
 
Tabel 27: Result of the chi-square test for the variable ”support”. 
 
 
Variable Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Sig. (Equal 
variances 
assumed 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
Mean 
Difference 
Support Germany 18 2,50 ,514    
 Sweden 34 
 
2,06 
 
,649 
 
,608 
 
,010 
 
,441 
 
Tabel 28: Result of the t-test for the variable ”support”. 
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Diagram 14: Focus of the debate about female directors on the boards. 
 
 
 Germany 
 
Sweden 
  Observed N Expected N Observed N Expected N 
Legislation 2 4,5 34 17,5 
Percentage 7 4,5 1 17,5 
Total 9   35   
      
Chi-Square 2,778   31,114 
df 1   1 
Asymp. Sig. ,096 
 
  ,000 
 
Tabel 29: Result of the chi-square test for the variable ”in what way are female directors on the 
boards debated?”. (The variables “both” and “other” are excluded since they are irrelevant for the 
test.) 
 
 
Variable Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Sig. (Equal 
variances 
assumed 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
Mean 
Difference 
What way Germany 9 1,78 ,441    
 Sweden 35 
 
1,03 
 
,169 
 
,000 
 
,001 
 
,749 
 
Tabel 30: Result of the t-test for the variable ”in what way are female directors on the boards 
debated?”. 
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Diagram 15: Standing point towards the effects of female directors on the boards. 
 
 
 Germany 
 
Sweden 
  Observed N Expected N Observed N Expected N 
Negative 
effects 
1 4,0 10 8,5 
Positive 
effects 
7 4,0 7 8,5 
Total 8   17   
     
Chi-Square 4,500  ,529 
df 1  1 
Asymp. Sig. ,034 
 
 ,467 
 
Tabel 31: Result of the chi-square test for the variables ”negative effects” and “positive effects”. 
 
 
Variable Country N Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Sig. (Equal 
variances 
assumed 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
Equal variances 
not assumed 
Mean 
Difference 
Effects Germany 8 1,88 ,354    
 Sweden 17 
 
1,41 
 
,507 
 
,001 
 
,016 
 
,463 
 
Tabel 32: Result of the t-test for the variables ”negative effects” and “positive effects”. 
 
 
